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If one reads a broad sample of interviews that have been conducted with South African 
filmmakers or film writers, then one might start to see a pattern in the types of complaints that 
emerge. Among these common complaints, one finds a widespread belief that the state is 
generally unwilling to fund certain types of films, and that contemporary South African 
audiences will avoid certain types of films. This dissertation explored whether the concept of 
Rainbowism could be adapted to theorise some reasons as to why the South African film 
industry seems to privilege certain narratives, whilst silencing others. A situation that is troubling 
when one considers South Africa's recent history.  
 
To accomplish this task, the author did a vast amount of reading on the subject of Rainbowism in 
general and on post-apartheid South African cinema in particular. From these numerous sources 
a way forward was synthesised. Rainbowism was defined in terms of myth and counter myth and 
its role in the creation of a new post-apartheid South African identity was also explored. 
Following this, South African cinema was historically contextualised and the state film-funding 
environment was explored. This was done in order to see the engagement between Rainbowism 
and the various funding bodies. 
 
It was shown that the emphasis on adapting to the post-apartheid state's neo-liberal economic 
policies had resulted in a situation in which film financing bodies such as the National Film and 
Video Foundation did not allow for audiences to grow in response to films. Rather, films had to 
be tailored to suit the preferences of existing audiences. This had a negative effect on those 
filmmakers that sought to try new things for which there might not yet have been an audience. 
Furthermore, it was also shown that South Africa's relatively peaceful transition from apartheid 
to democracy has become a feature of international co-productions; the desire to sell the idea of 
the rainbow nation has effected the types of engagements with the past that are displayed in these 
films.  
 
This dissertation has shown that there is a gap between the principles upon which artistic 
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Before continuing on to the main areas of analysis that are found within the chapters that make 
up this dissertation, it is necessary to briefly contextualise some of the key concepts. This shall 
be done in order to ensure that the reader is cognisant of what these terms mean when they are 
utilised in the pages to follow.   
 
Post-apartheid: At its simplest, the term "post-apartheid" is an adjective that is used to place 
something chronologically after the first-ever democratic general elections of April 1994. These 
elections saw the African National Congress become the ruling party and Nelson Mandela 
become the first-ever black President of the Republic. The ascension of Mandela to the highest 
office in the land is generally seen as the official end of the apartheid period that had existed 
from about 1948 to 1994. 
 
Dominant myth: "dominant myths" are modes of speech which emerge out of a particular 
position of political or social power (Reid, 2011: 3). The primary function of the dominant myth 
is the "justification" or "naturalisation" of an ideological message which those in a position of 
political or social power approve of and seek to disseminate in some way (ibid.). This 
conceptualisation of myth comes from Julie Reid's 2011 PhD Study. In that study, the term 
"myth" is used as a type of shorthand for "dominant myth" (ibid.). In a similar fashion, the term 
"myth" in this dissertation shall also occasionally be used as shorthand for the longer term 
"dominant myth".  
 
Counter myth: "Counter myth" is a term that Reid uses to describe myths which "attempt to 
supplant the dominant myth discourse with an alternative meaning and one which is decidedly 
different to that of the dominant myth" (2011: 3). Thus while the dominant myth is often a 
prominent and well established discourse in a society, the counter myth seeks to offer a message 
of opposition in some way (ibid.).   
 
"White" South Africans: Gary Baines argues that the past has shown that when a single 
national identity has been asserted, other identities have been precluded (1998: 2). Expressions 
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of a national identity are commonly defined by the group that is dominant in terms of political 
and economic power (ibid.). During the apartheid era, the dominant group was the white 
community as a result of apartheid system which ensured that the apparatus of the state and 
access to resources maintained solely in the hands of the white minority (ibid.). The white 
community consisted primarily of Anglophone and Afrikaans-speaking White South Africans of 
European extract (ibid.). Both of these groups defined themselves primarily in contradistinction 
to South Africa's indigenous black population but "they also distinguished themselves from each 
other through adopting a different standpoint to the 'other'" (ibid.) In this respect, the issue of 
"whiteness" was the primary factor that informed the creation of white identity, which ensured 
that race was a "salient social category in South Africa" (ibid.).  
 
"Black" South Africans: Mistry argues that the communities that make up the black majority in 
South Africa were all equally oppressed by the same principles of apartheid because their status 
as 'non-whites' marked them as targets for the regime's apartheid policies (2001: 6). She notes 
that: 
 
... the Afrikaner Nationalist Party did not differentiate ethnically among blacks (Africans) 
but segregated people within its own broad definitions of race. Recall that Indians and 
Coloreds were marked as such and entitled their own privileges, but still fell under the larger 
rubric of “black” (ibid.). 
 
This dissertation shall not stress the differences in "blackness" which the regime forcibly 
inscribed upon people. Unless otherwise stated in the context of the text, the word "black" will 
simply refer to all the groups that the regime considered to be "non-white". 
 
Rainbow Nation: The most famous descriptor of the new South Africa, it has become somewhat 
synonymous with the post-apartheid dispensation (Gqola, 2001: 99). Baines argues that 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu is traditionally credited with coining the phrase (1998: 1). Tutu spoke 
of South Africans as the "Rainbow People of God" in a number of television appearances and the 
terminology subsequently caught hold of the public imagination (ibid.). This idea of the 
"Rainbow Nation" is the primary identity myth of the new South Africa, one that counters older 
apartheid divisions that were based upon race (Van Staden, 1997: 49). Pumla Gqola calls the 
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"rainbow nation" an aspirational descriptor of how South Africans would like to relate to each 
other (2007: 112). In this sense, it is reference to a type of nonracialism because "rainbow nation 
rhetoric avoids reference to colour in the sense of race" and instead the colours are simply 
symbolic of South Africa's diverse and usually unspecified racial, ethnic or cultural groups 
(Baines, 1998: 2).  
 
Rainbowism: A term that is often used interchangeably with "rainbow nationalism" and 
"rainbow nation". In the context of this dissertation, the term "Rainbowism" primarily describes 
the act of invoking the rainbow nation as a means of silencing dissenting voices on the state of 
the nation (Gqola, 2001: 99). The silencing of dissenting voices with regards to race and the 
apartheid past shall be one of the major sites of analysis going forward (ibid.). However, these 
acts of silencing are also sometimes unintentional. The reason being that Rainbowism exists as a 
type of nationalism and as Neil Lazarus has argued: "All nationalisms are therefore appropriative, 
since they all claim unisonance, and since these claims necessarily involve speaking for - and 
therefore silencing - others" (1999, 109).  
   
Halo-period: The decade following 1994 which “was widely and affectionately referred to as 
the halo-period” (Reid, 2011: 362). It is the period in which the idea of the rainbow nation was 

















"[...] We are told that this is a county of miracles—the miracle of the birth of a rainbow 
nation. I wonder. Perhaps the greatest miracle in this country is how we have made silence 
an industry [...] people see things, they don't talk about them, and they get rewarded for their 
silence. When you look in the arts, the voices that are promoted are those that buy into this 
paradigm of a rainbow nation, which is really incarcerating because you cannot go in there 
with everything. You have to leave some things behind and be nice. That's what the rainbow 
thing is about. It's about making pleasant gestures. If your art has rough edges to it or 
recalls things that people want to drop off the national agenda, if your art operates outside 
of special containers, there is a problem."  
 
- Kgafela Oa Magogodi (In McCluskey, 2009: 98-99) 
 
This dissertation, shall attempt to explore the situation that Magogodi is describing in the above 
quote. The idea that the paradigm of the rainbow nation, arguably the most famous descriptor of 
post-apartheid South Africa, could be used as a means of silencing cinematic voices in a country 
with a constitution that "is universally considered to be the model for democratic governance" is 
definitely worthy of deeper engagement (Saks, 2010: 73). It is also important to explore any 
potential elements that might be negatively affecting the South African film industry, especially 
considering the industry's history of exclusion, fragmentation and role in propagating apartheid 
ideology. 
 
The notion that the "Rainbow Nation" is invoked as a means of silencing dissenting voices is not 
a new one, especially considering that Pumla Gqola wrote about this problem of "Rainbowism" 
as early as the year 2001. However, the question of how Rainbowism engages with South 
African cinema in particular has rarely been examined in much detail. Magogodi's belief that 
adhering to this compulsory rainbow nation paradigm silences art that, "has rough edges to it or 
recalls things that people want to drop off the national agenda," shall be one of the focal points of 
analysis in the chapters to come. However, this dissertation shall not attempt to explore every 
manifestation or formulation of Rainbowism, it shall be confined primarily to questions relating 
to whether the invocation of the rainbow nation affects the creation of a more critical or artistic 
South African cinema. Furthermore, some of the case studies for this dissertation shall explore 
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examples of South African films that respond in some way to Rainbowism's attempts to 
obfuscate an aspect of the past, or the continuing legacy of racism in the present for that matter.  
 
In order to accomplish this broader plan, a number of things shall be done in the chapters to 
follow. Chapter "2. Literature Review", shall contextualise the writings on the subject at hand in 
relation to broader scholarship.  
 
Following this, Rainbowism shall be contextualised, what it means and the role it plays in South 
Africa shall be explored and a loose framework shall also be developed to guide the analysis to 
follow. This framework will be adapted from many different sources. This will entail Chapter "3. 
Rainbowism - Definitions"  
 
Chapter "4. A Historical Contextualisation of South African Cinema" shall simply provide a 
historical contextualisation of South African cinema.  
 
Chapter "5. State Funding in the Rainbow Nation" shall explore the various funding bodies in 
post-apartheid South Africa and the ways in which Rainbowism interacts with them.  
 
Chapter "6. Suleman and Peterson: Against the Rainbow" shall look at the work of director 
Ramadan Suleman and his writing partner Bhekiziwe Peterson. Their films Fools (1997) and 
Zulu Love Letter (2004) serve as case studies of films which specifically act as foils to 
Rainbowism.  
 
Chapter "7. Rainbowism and the South African Gangster Film" shall explore how the genre of 
the gangster film can be used to subvert the discourses of the rainbow nation in Ralph Ziman's 
film Jerusalema (2008) and reaffirm them in Donovan Marsh's film Dollars and White Pipes 
(2005)  
 








Many scholars have written about the rainbow nation and even utilised the term Rainbowism to 
describe similar forms of analysis as those which shall be found within this dissertation. 
However as was stated in the introduction, very few scholars have attempted to utilise the 
terminology of Rainbowism in an exploration of issues affecting post-apartheid South African 
cinema.  
 
For example, Pumla Gqola, whose original conceptualisation of "Rainbowism" was a vital 
resource for much of this dissertation, located her work primarily in the realm of linguistics. 
Martha Evans essentially explored how television aided the construction of Rainbowism, while 
Melissa Tandiwe Myambo looked at Rainbowism in post-apartheid South African novels. One 
exception is Jesse Arseneault who utilised the concept of Rainbowism to explore the 2003 film 
Proteus for his 2010 Masters Dissertation Races Among Men: Masculinity and Interracial 
Community in South African Cultural texts.  
 
Julie Reid's 2011 PhD thesis A Theoretical Exploration of The Construction of Counter Myth: A 
Case Study of Post Apartheid South African Film was an essential part of defining Rainbowism 
in the context of this dissertation. Her framework on myth and counter-myth informed much of 
the thinking on Rainbowism located in Chapter Three. Her definition of the myth of the rainbow 
nation as a counter-myth that denaturalised apartheid identity myths was a useful way of 
connecting various strands of thought in that context.   
 
2.2 Post-apartheid South African Cinema 
 
In Astrid Treffry-Goatley's 2010 PhD thesis, she asserted that the term "post-apartheid" 
grounded her study in a particular socio-political era and indicated her intention to "link the 
analysis presented to the overall workings of the post-apartheid state" (8). She claimed that "this 
integrated approach to cinematic analysis can be also linked to existing writings on South 
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African cinema" (2010: 8). Silence at the End of the Rainbow: An Analysis of the Effects of 
Rainbowism on South African Cinema shall attempt to do likewise and link the discussion on 
Rainbowism to the post-apartheid state. This shall be accomplished by looking at state funding 
bodies such as the National Film and Video Foundation (NFVF) and its Sediba Scriptwriter's 
Training and Development Programme. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and DTI 
Film Incentive shall also be explored to a lesser extent.  
 
Furthermore, Treffry-Goatley defined the goal of her study as contributing to the "existing body 
of knowledge on post-apartheid South African cinema" (2010: 9). Treffry-Goatley's qualitative 
and quantitative research, which added to South Africa's existing body of knowledge on South 
African cinema, contrasts interestingly with Litheko Modisane's approach in his 2013 book 
South Africa's Renegade Reels: The Making and Public Lives of Black Centered Films. 
Modisane's emphasis was not on "the location, and use of hitherto unknown archival sources, as 
well as fresh material, but on the application of a fresh analytical approach to a text-rich field" 
(2013: 11). This dissertation shall be utilising a similar approach to Modisane going forward. 
 
While this dissertation is primarily exploring aspects related to South African cinema, it shall 
also be utilising a small amount of scholarship on broader African cinemas in the chapters to 
follow. The reason being, that some of the films that have been selected as case studies for this 
dissertation have similar thematic motifs and/or visual aesthetics to films which originate from 
African cinemas in the rest of the continent.  
 
Therefore, this dissertation is aligned with a particular understanding of an assertion that Keyan 
Tomaselli made in his 2006 book, Encountering Modernity: Twentieth-Century South African 
Cinema, in that it was time for South African film scholarship to become "Africanised" (Cited in 
Dovey, 2009: 57). Dovey went about this task of "Africanising" scholarship on South African 
cinema by comparing South African films and West African films in her 2009 book African Film 
and Literature: Adapting Violence to the screen (57). This dissertation by contrast, shall be much 
less ambitious and simply attempt to utilise scholarship that was originally devoted to the 
analysis of Sub-Saharan African cinemas (Dovey, 2009: 57; Saks, 2010: 156). Alexie Tcheuyap's 
work on post-nationalist African cinemas will be very useful in this regard. 
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3. Rainbowism - Definitions 
 
This chapter shall be exploring what the term "Rainbowism" means in the context of post-
apartheid South African society. This will be done in order to begin to explore what effects it 
might have had upon the films that were made in this particular context. To begin this task, 
Reid's framework will be explored and then "Rainbowism" shall be looked at in more depth.  
 
3.1 Dominant Myth 
 
Reid argues that all types of myths are an integral part of human culture; they help members of a 
group to articulate the beliefs they share amongst themselves and to articulate these beliefs to the 
rest of the world (2011: 55). The usage of myths is a universal phenomenon amongst every 
culture, but every unique social grouping uses myths to protect or project different values (ibid.).   
 
The "dominant myth" is generally accepted by myth theorists to be the ideological property of 
the portion of a society which holds political and social power over the other sections (Reid, 
2011: 25). Therefore, the dominant section of a society is the group whose interests are served 
primarily by the dominant myth and its associated naturalisations (ibid.). To put it another way, 
the dominant myth discourse most often operates in service to this dominant section of society 
and it works "to justify and naturalise those structures which maintain the dominant group‟s 
position of privilege" (Reid, 2011: 26).  
 
Thus in the context of South Africa during apartheid, the dominant section of society were white 
South Africans in general, because they held supreme political and economic power as a result of 
the apartheid system (Baines, 1998: 2). Apartheid ideologues subsequently sought to use mass 
media to disseminate myths that showed apartheid as the natural order of things (ibid.). Mass 
media was also used to try and justify the various privileges that white community had bestowed 
upon themselves on account of their "whiteness" (ibid.). 
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3.2 Counter Myth 
 
"Counter myth", is a term that Reid uses to describe myths which "attempt to supplant the 
dominant myth discourse with an alternative meaning and one which is decidedly different to 
that of the dominant myth" (2011: 3). In this respect, while the dominant myth is often a 
prominent and well established discourse in a society, the counter myth seeks to offer a message 
of opposition (Reid, 2011: 3-4). This message of opposition is a conscious action on the part of a 
producer of the counter myth, someone who acts in the stead of a social grouping that finds the 
dominant myth incongruent with their own ideological leanings (Reid, 2011: 4).  
 
Thus the counter myth seeks to denaturalise the types of representations that are found in 
dominant myth discourse and replace them with an alternate view of the world, one which is 
closer to the ideological positioning of the entity that initially created the counter mythical 
discourse (Reid, 2011: 4). Therefore, while the dominant myth most often serves as a tool for 
maintaining the status quo, the counter myth seeks to change the status quo and inspire readers of 
the myth to acknowledge the need for social change (ibid.). Furthermore, Reid asserts that 
because counter myth is often a catalyst for social change, its content is seen as political in nature 
(ibid.).  
 
Reid argues that counter-myth is initially catalysed and brought into existence due to a feeling of 
"collective (though not universal) social discord among a certain group within a certain social 
environment towards a certain more dominant mythic discourse" (2011: 29). An important 
caveat to remember is the fact that there is substantial "inter-animation" between the dominant 
myth and the counter myth because one is not the binary opposite of the other (Reid, 2011: 166).  
 
In this respect, the counter myths of the anti-apartheid struggle in regards to identity formation, 
sought to denaturalise the specific labels that apartheid had foisted upon people by reclaiming 
them (Gqola, 2001: 95). Gqola argues that: 
 
The language of apartheid definition and control had always been challenged by the 
liberation movements ... The Black Consciousness Movement, for instance, recognised 
instantly that apartheid was predicated on division and the enforced legitimisation of these 
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disunities through language. Rejecting apartheid division and naming, it deconstructed 'non-
white' identities and reclaimed 'black' as a racial signifier which united all those cordoned off 
into Bantustans or labelled 'Coloured' and Indian (ibid.) 
 
3.3 The Counter Myth of the Rainbow Nation 
 
Reid argues that myths are also based upon cultural values and can be a factor that influences or 
possibly even determines how people behave within a cultural group (2011: 79). In this respect, 
myths can be personal and manifest uniquely in the mind of an individual, or they can be seen on 
a national or cultural scale (ibid.). She argues that questions surrounding myth in relation to the 
nation are immensely important in regards to the post-apartheid context in which counter myth 
occupies an important function in the South African mass media (ibid.). She goes on to say that 
there is a "resemiotisation" of the South African cultural landscape taking place because the 
signs that the world knew apartheid South Africa by (and the signs it knew itself by) are 
obviously no longer relevant in a constitutional and democratic South Africa (Reid, 2011: 7). 
Thus new mythologies have been created and continually reified through media representation 
until they are part of the dominant myth discourse in the South African context (ibid.). These are 
myths that helped South Africans to rapidly reformulate and reinterpret "the national identities 
which were previously legally prescribed by an apartheid government" (ibid.). In this regard, 
Reid's study goes on to suggest that there is a second catalyst of counter mythical action (Reid, 
2011: 330-331). She describes the situation thusly:   
 
When a dominant myth discourse exhausts its power position within society, mythic 
descriptors of togetherness or of the collective (the nation) as well as mythic significations of 
the self and the Other must be reconstituted. Because such new mythic significations are in 
such ideological contrast to prior mythic descriptors they qualify as counter mythical, as they 
work to offer alternate or counter meanings to the mythic descriptors of the past, or a counter 
view of history (Reid, 2011: 311). 
 
Therefore, counter myth in the South African context of the transition from apartheid to 
democracy shifted from a scenario in which counter mythical opposition took the form of 
combating dominant myths that were produced by a white bourgeoisie. Towards a situation in 
which counter myths sought to naturalise the position of the "newly empowered group" who 
achieved political power after the South African General Elections of 1994 (Reid, 2011: 331). 
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Thus Reid argues that these new counter myths do not simply perform mythical actions that 
disrupt the dominant myth discourses of a society, but “may also serve to encourage the social 
collective to function as a coherent whole" (2011: 332). One of these was the counter-myth of 
the Rainbow Nation which sought to denaturalise the identity myths that had been disseminated 
during the apartheid era and get South Africans seeing themselves as one nation (Reid, 2011: 
331). 
 
3.4 Tutu's "Rainbow People of God" 
 
In this respect, Baines argues that South Africa's readmission to the community of civilised 
nations in 1994 was accompanied for a search for a new national identity (1998: 1). This fits in 
with Reid who argues that when an established order is overturned, through economic factors or 
perhaps a revolution, there is a need for the people living within the affected society to seek out a 
new conceptualisation of where they fit into the world (2011: 81). Thus after so many years of 
having one's social world and economic potential limited by apartheid conceptualisations of 
one's race, the country needed to reformulate what it meant to be a "South African" in a 
democratic and constitutional society (Gqola, 2001: 96). 
 
According to Saks, this idea of the "New South Africa" needed "an act of immense imagination 
to bring it into existence and to maintain it, often in the face of insuperable diversity" (2010: 2). 
This "insuperable diversity" was found in South Africa's manifold peoples and cultures, all of 
whom had different experiential knowledge of the immediate apartheid past (Saks, 2010: 2; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ndhlovu, 2013: 12).  While post-apartheid South Africa had finally achieved 
some semblance of congruity with the first line of the Freedom Charter, in that South Africa 
finally belonged to "all who live in it, black and white" the question of how to bind these 
disparate groups together as a collective entity loomed large at the time (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & 
Ndhlovu, 2013: 12).  Martha Evans argues that the metaphor of the 'rainbow nation' was the most 
visible response to the question of how to build a new nation (2010: 309) 
 
Tutu's symbolic usage of the phrase "Rainbow Children of God" helped to grant legitimacy to 
the idea of the rainbow nation (Myambo, 2010: 94; Gqola, 2001: 99). He had garnered immense 
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adoration from the liberal media of the world during his stewardship of the United Democratic 
Front and for his later role as the face of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation (Evans, 2010: 
309). These achievements resulted in him being seen a South Africa's de facto moral conscience 
(Myambo, 2010: 94). Thus it was not hyperbolic when William Gumede wrote that Tutu's usage 
of the rainbow nation imagery "bestowed divineness on South Africa‟s ethnic diversity” (2005: 
242). 
 
Gqola argues that Tutu's usage of the rainbow nation analogy was powerful in its symbolism as  
it did not attempt to deny that South Africans were different from each other, rather it was 
premised upon his belief that all South Africans could co-exist in peace and harmony in spite of 
and because of these differences (2001: 99). The democratic dispensation of the new South 
Africa with its liberal constitution made this type of understanding of nationhood an actual 
possibility for the first time in South African history (ibid.). Gqola argues that South Africa's 
liberal constitution, was a founding document that allowed South Africans to project an idealised 
image of the South African society that would exist if everybody was a paragon of their best 
selves (2007: 112). In this respect, the constitution was an aspirational document in much the 
same way that Tutu's expression of South Africans as the "Rainbow People of God" was an 
aspirational descriptor (ibid.). Gqola asserts that a hope-giving aspirational label such as the 
"rainbow nation" occupied a similar role as the provisions of the constitution, in that it was 
hoped that such a labelling process would "bring us closer to the society described in both" 
(ibid.). Thus the label of the "rainbow nation" like the constitution is about "how we should 
relate to one another, what we should be able to assume and invest in one another" (ibid.)  
 
Writing in 1997, Christo Van Staden argued that the "Rainbow Nationalism" that was emerging 
at the time could be seen as discourse specifically meant to counter older forms of nationalism 
that had emerged during and as a result of the apartheid system (49). Thus Rainbow Nationalism 
acted as a counter to nationalist discourses such as Afrikaner nationalism which excluded the 
majority of South Africa's population (ibid.). Rainbow Nationalism was not only a discourse that 
countered myths of white nationhood, but other nationalist discourses that contained 
segregationist aspects, such as a particular conceptualization of Zulu nationalism which sought a 
separate Zulu Kingdom in the old apartheid homeland of Kwazulu (ibid.). Therefore, the 
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emphasis on the metaphor of the rainbow nation was an attempt to move away from a type of 
primordial nationalism that was founded upon notions of linguistic and cultural purity (Evans, 
2010: 309).  
 
3.5 Nelson Mandela and the Rainbow Nation 
 
Myambo argues that "Nelson Mandela quickly adopted Tutu‟s “rainbow nation of God” 
terminology as the sentiment behind it was an extension of the African National Congress‟s 
“non-racialism”" (2010: 94). Evans asserts that the mythology of what she also refers to as 
"rainbow nationalism" became equally, or perhaps even more synonymous with Mandela, whose 
"own mythology became intertwined with that of the „new‟ nation" (2010: 309). Mandela's 
decision to preach forgiveness and reconciliation, as opposed violent retribution after his release 
from prison, added to the global popularity that he had acquired as a result of the anti-apartheid 
movement turning him into one of the focal points in the struggle against apartheid. Evans 
highlights how the rainbow not only acted as a symbol of South Africa's multi-ethnic and 
multicultural population, but it also links to the well-known Biblical story of Noah and the flood, 
in which the "rainbow served as a sign of God‟s oath never to wreak vengeance on humanity 
again" (ibid.). Thus it is not inconceivable to assume that a country with a majority Christian 
population would associate the metaphor of the rainbow used by Tutu and Mandela with the 
biblical narrative in which the old had passed away and the new had come (ibid.).  
 
Evans puts forth the preposition that the establishment of rainbow nationalism is heavily 
indebted to the mass media, with the medium of television in particular providing the public with 
three compelling televised displays of the new national identity (2010: 310). She contrasts South 
Africa's rainbow nationalism with the type of American nationalism that D.W. Griffith's film The 
Birth of The Nation (1915) utilised in its attempts to codify American national identity through 
the mythologisation of its recent history (ibid.). Evans argues that rainbow nationalism is 
different to the types of nationalism found in American mass media texts like The Birth of The 
Nation because it sidesteps South Africa's indelibly painful past by continually refocusing 
attention upon the present (ibid.). Rainbow nationalism also gained immense traction through 
three live broadcasts that all featured Nelson Mandela (ibid.).  
14 
 
The first television event was Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990 to cheering crowds 
whilst he walked hand in hand with his wife, the popular struggle veteran, Winnie Mandela 
(ibid.). The second important televised event was Mandela's inauguration as the first post-
apartheid President of the Republic (ibid.). Mistry asserts that "The Rainbow Nation" campaign 
was in full-swing at this event because the ceremony contained cultural representations from 
every section of the population (2001: 9). White people, Indian people and Coloured people thus 
had equal and proportional representation in relation to the "various African ethnic 
denominations" (ibid.). Mistry summarises the choice of representations as timely, as it was 
important: 
 
... to represent the good faith of negotiated politics in the new South Africa; abating the fears 
of minorities and sealing the promise of a peaceful transition to a free and democratic 
situation. This ideological ethos permeated the rest of Mandela‟s office with symbolic 
displays of this at sports events, arts and cultural occasions (ibid.). 
 
The most prominent display of rainbow nationalism was found in the third televised event, 
Nelson Mandela's appearances at the opening ceremony and final match of the 1995 Rugby 
World Cup which South Africa hosted (Mistry, 2001: 9; Evans, 2010: 310). The image of a 
beaming Nelson Mandela wearing the Number 6 Jersey of Springbok Captain Francois Pienaar, 
as he handed the trophy over to Pienaar in the wake of South Africa's victory in the final match 
against New Zealand, became world famous (Evans, 2010: 310; Arseneault, 2013: 38). The 
events of the Rugby World Cup would later get the Hollywood treatment through Clint 
Eastwood's 2009 film Invictus starring Morgan Freeman as Nelson Mandela and Matt Damon as 
Francois Pienaar (Arseneault, 2013: 38). According to Arseneault, the film served to "glorify the 
nonracialism of Mandela as he selflessly overlooked a history of racism in support of the 
Springboks" and possibly "obscured the nuances of the post-Apartheid nation state‟s many 
challenges, of which racial tensions were one of many " (ibid.).  
 
Evans argues that these three television broadcasts helped to make the country look unified and 
stable, a vital step that was conducive to bringing the South African economy back to life (2010: 
310). The South African economy had been somewhat excluded from the global economy 
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through economic sanctions and various boycotts and as a result the new government desperately 
needed capital investment (Saks, 2010: 1; Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 3). Furthermore, Evans asserts 
that these televised events helped to garner popular support for the style of transition the ANC 
leadership had decided upon (2010: 310).   
 
Baines argues that the discursive construction of this new identity took place through the media 
and "other forums of public discourse" (1998, 3). The public broadcaster, the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) also assumed some responsibility for the national unity of the 
country as every advertisement break in programming brought forth the repetitive jingle: 
"Simunye - We are one" as a testament to the nation's unity (ibid.). He goes on to say that:  
 
The content of certain radio and television programmes, and even some private sector funded 
advertisements convey the message of nation building. For instance, South African 
Breweries who are the chief sponsors of the national soccer team (the Bafana Bafana) have 
promoted Castle Lager with the slogan "One Beer, One Nation". As cultural carriers, the 
media have been crucial in disseminating the rhetoric of 'Rainbowism' (ibid.). 
 
This public rehearsal of unity through sports has continued well into in the post-apartheid context, 
with televised sporting events playing an integral role in constructing a perception of national 
unity (Gqola, 2001: 100). Rugby union, cricket and association football are all co-opted into 
creating an image of unity, usually through the camera focus on mixed spectators who join 
together as one to sing the South Africa's hybrid national anthem and get behind a common 
cause (Gqola, 2001: 100-101).  
 
3.6 Rainbowism and Nonracialism 
 
Evans argues that the displays of a reconciled national identity from this period could also be 
seen as a facade that did not do much to dismantle the massive structural inequalities wrought by 
the apartheid system (2010: 310). Thus the images from this era seemed to suggest that the new 
nation was a finished product, an occurrence which disguised a number of the era's significant 
contradictions and shifted attention away from difficult implications that emerged from 
achieving political reform without socio-economic reform (ibid.).  
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This ties into Pumla Gqola's conceptualisation of "Rainbowism" which she defined as a series of 
"intertwined and competing processes" (2001: 99). She asserts that continual invocation of South 
Africa as the rainbow nation, may have helped to build a collective national identity that counters 
the older colonialist and apartheid ways of defining the self in relation to the other, but it also 
prevents a thorough examination of the intersectionality of race and power in the new South 
Africa (Gqola, 2001: 103). Gqola asserts that Rainbowism became less progressive as time went 
on, as it became "an authorising narrative which assisted in the denial of difference" (2001: 99).  
 
The reason for this is found if one looks deeper at image of the rainbow as a primary descriptor 
of the South African people, Gqola believes that "within the boundaries of Rainbowism there 
exist a series of possibilities that (potentially) rupture the ideal" (ibid.). The use of this metaphor 
results in various forms of ethnic and cultural diversity being conceptualised as having their 
place on the metaphorical spectrum of light (ibid.). The boundaries between colours in this 
imaginative construct are subsequently blurred in terms of difference and the various distinctions 
between each colour grouping become fluid (ibid.). However, Rainbows are also fleeting and 
perpetually out of the reach of those who chase them, as the metaphor of "chasing the rainbow" 
attests (ibid.). Gqola adeptly summarises the contradictions of Rainbowism thusly: 
 
The metaphor of the rainbow people is hailed as a celebration of unity and the successes of a 
post-apartheid dispensation. Yet its benefits continue to elude, slip and mock. It rejects 
transparency and its constitutive meanings constantly undercut each other. It foregrounds 
difference at precisely the moment during which it trivialises its implications. Thus, an 
interrogation of its connotations yields no definitive answers. It simultaneously leads 
everywhere and nowhere, is helpful and dangerous because even as it asserts its presence, it 
signifies absence (2001: 110) 
 
Gqola argues that being counted amongst these rainbow people thus implies that one has an 
equal opportunity for wealth acquisition, or has "equal access to the mythic pot of gold" as she 
phrases it (2001: 100).  However, the reality is that even in a democratic South Africa the 
continuing economic legacy of the apartheid system prevents many black South Africans from 
attaining their pot of gold at the end of the rainbow (ibid.). Thus Gqola argues that Rainbowism 
works as a means of silencing any attempts to highlight the readily apparent differences in 
economic power that continue to manifest in South African society (ibid.). Even with 
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government mandated attempts at redress, there remains substantial economic disparity between 
those who the apartheid regime considered "white" and those that the regime considered "non-
white" (ibid.) Rainbowism thus helps obscure the fact that "[m]ost of the economic elite is white 
(which is not the same as saying that most whites are in the economic elite), and most [black] 
Africans are poor" (MacDonald, 2006: 4) 
 
A potential reason for this is found in the way that the nonracialism of the rainbow nation ideal 
has been deployed when a situation calls for the emphasis of a type of non-racialism, but not 
necessarily a form of anti-racism (Gqola, 2001: 99-100). In this context, references to post-
apartheid South Africa as the rainbow nation would generally accompany the statements of those 
who claim not to see race. Achille Mbembe argues that the fact that the ANC failed to turn white 
guilt about apartheid: 
 
... into a moral debt ... has let the most reactionary sectors of white society off the hook while 
chasing away those progressive and antiracist whites who could have supported the idea of a 
radical transformation of the society (2014: online resource). 
 
Mbembe argues that conservative and reactionary elements in South African society have co-
opted nonracialism and now equate it with a form of colour-blindness, while also mobilising the 
discourse of "nonracialism to silence those who point to any trace of racism in the present, or call 
for some form of reparation for the injustices of the past" (2014: online resource). When one 
considers that white South Africans did not have to give up anything after the political change to 
democracy, or pay any kind of reparations as the Germans had to after the Second World War, it 
becomes possible to argue that the deployment of the rainbow nation becomes a means of 
shutting down debates on whether the status quo is truly just as it currently stands (ibid.). 
However, it is also important to remember that Rainbowism or rainbow nationalism is not in and 
of itself a problem, Stuart Hall said that nationalism: 
 
... isn't necessarily either a reactionary or a progressive force, politically ... It is capable of 
being inflected to very different political positions, at different historical moments and its 
character depends very much on the other traditions, discourses and forces with which it is 
articulated. (1993: 355) 
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Therefore, while some regroups in post-apartheid society might have interpreted the 
nonracialism inherent in the myth of the rainbow nation as a means of silencing debate on the 
continuing effects on the past on South African society. This type of side effect was obviously 
not the intention that Tutu and Mandela had when they adopted the rainbow nation as one of the 
primary identity myths of the new South Africa (Evans, 2010: 323).  
 
3.7 The Rainbow Nation after the Halo-Period 
 
Since the new millennium, the idea of the new South Africa as a country that was "alive with 
possibility" (as the popular slogan went) has become somewhat tarnished (Saks, 2010: 14). This 
is because the heady idealism that characterised much of the halo-period faded in the wake of 
trying to fix the enormous problems that were left over from the apartheid era (Saks, 2010: 14). 
Treffry-Goatley asserts that South Africa was in a dire financial situation in the immediate post-
apartheid era because three and a half centuries of racial hatred and systematic violence had not 
only resulted in a profoundly ailing national psyche, but also a colossal lack of state capacity in 
terms of financial and administrative competence (2010: 3).  
 
Saks argues that even though the ANC restructured the South African economy in accordance 
with neo-liberal frameworks and the various demands of global capital, "investment has not 
flowed into the country" and "unemployment is at catastrophic levels" (Saks, 2010: 14). In 
addition to this, "privatization has diminished the power of the state to provide a safety net for 
the poor and the sick" (ibid.). South Africa has also continued to be one of the world's most 
unequal societies along with Guatemala and Brazil (ibid.). The HIV/AIDS pandemic has also 
decimated the most active demographic of society, those between the ages of 18 and 42 (ibid.). 
Evans argues that the "current context, dominated by tense race relations, uprisings against lack 
of service delivery, increasing inequality and ongoing white emigration, suggests that the 
rainbow nationalist period may have inadvertently helped to defer rather than deflect revolution" 
(2010: 323). 
 
Reid argues that the Halo-period had ended by around 2004, and in that same year Gqola noted a 
perceived shift in "public parlance" as though South Africa had started to move away from the 
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emphasis on unity and towards new ways of defining "South Africanness" (Gqola, 2004: 6; Reid, 
2011: 362). Gqola argues that the continual media references to South Africa in the rainbow 
nation, had served to get South Africans seeing themselves as the rainbow nation and describing 
themselves in that way (2004: 6). This was part of the aforementioned aspirational quality that 
was attached to the label of the rainbow nation, thus as Gqola notes: 
 
In the 10th year of South Africa‟s democracy, “rainbow nation” has disappeared almost 
entirely from public parlance. It is possible that at the precise moment we perceived 
ourselves as achieving “rainbow nation” status, its assertion became redundant. While the 
media had given us little reprieve from declarations of “rainbow nation” citizenship, the 
dominant trend now points to their apparent commitment to uncovering the textures of that 
status (ibid.) 
  
The absence of rainbow nation discourse in "public parlance" possibly signals that the counter 
myth of the rainbow nation succeeded to some extent at denaturalising the dominant myths 
around national identity that were leftover from the apartheid era. Thus it might be possible to 
see Rainbowism as having become the new dominant myth in the post Halo-period context and 
one that new counter myths will seek to work against, or change in some way going forward 
(Reid, 2011: 362). 
 
3.8 Rainbowism and Film 
 
Thus Rainbowism can be seen as an important factor in the creation of post-apartheid South 
African national identity, in the paragraphs above it was detailed how television and other forms 
of media helped to continually reify the counter-myth of the rainbow nation. A myth which 
denaturalised apartheid-era conceptualisations of "the self" and "the other" through a focus upon 
the contemporary diversity of South Africa's rainbow people, instead of a focus upon the horrors 
of the racialised past (Evans, 2010: 310; Reid, 2011: 311). Reid notes how the myth of the 
rainbow nation has been disseminated across a variety of media and has thus assumed a 
multifaceted form (2011: 142).  
 
This is an appropriate point to begin an exploration of Rainbowism in relation to South African 
cinema. Maingard argues that the cinema is of crucial importance in relation to ideas of 
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nationhood and citizenship because the cinematic medium has the potential to "both shape and 
reflect our perceptions" on these subjects (2007: 3). In the modern era, the "collective" is defined 
mostly in terms of the nation; therefore it makes sense to explore what effects Rainbowism as a 
type of nationalism has had upon South African cinema (Reid, 2011: 183). Furthermore, by 
looking at how the nation is representing itself (or what it is not representing for that matter), one 
can tell a great deal about its cultural priorities and the artistic health of the society. Reid asserts 
that South African cinema in a democratic South Africa has the potential to not only present the 
changes within society, but put forth ways of easing the transition (2011: 184). She quotes Botha 
who argued that: 
 
One can argue that film is an important part of the cultural domain in any country, but 
particularly so in South Africa where social change depends on the quality of communication 
in the society. Communication is one of the cornerstones of democracy, and film and video 
can make an important contribution to the democratisation and development that need to take 
place within this society ... as forms of popular fiction, films and videos such … can explore 
the changes taking place in South Africa in a way that helps people to make sense of these 
dramatic changes (2002: online resource). 
 
Therefore, if Rainbowism was being continually invoked in the halo-period in order to try and 
get South Africans seeing themselves as a collective group, a task that would surely help with a 
form of social cohesion. Then it follows that Rainbowism would most likely manifest in the 
films that the country made as well as in the broader filmmaking context. The myth of the 
rainbow nation finds cinematic representation and reification predominantly in comedy films; 
such as White Wedding (2009), Jozi (2010) and Fanie Fourie's Lobola (2013) as well as the very 
popular work of comedian Leon Schuster (Reid, 2011: 142; Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 110). 
Various culture clashes between diverse peoples generally make up much of the humour in these 
films. However, due to length constraints this dissertation shall not be engaging with comedy 
films as case studies, instead focus shall be shifted towards those films that engage with 






4. A Historical Contextualisation of South African Cinema 
 
Any discussion on South African cinematic culture needs to be premised by a historical 
contextualisation, Masilela asserts this much when he says that "making sense of the country's 
film culture requires an awareness of the intellectual movements that informed its early reception 
and practice" (2003: 15). 
 
A useful starting point is Botha's assertion that the focal problem of South African Cinema over 
the years is the way in which the medium has almost always been seen in terms of its 
commercial value as opposed to its value as a disseminator, as well as an expression, of culture 
(2012: 159). He argues that film should not only be seen in terms of its commercial viability but 
also as a "product of culture, such as indigenous literature, theatre, the plastic arts and music" 
(ibid.).  
 
The earliest film projection devices had arrived in the Johannesburg goldfields as early as the 
year 1895 (Botha, 2012: 11). While South Africa's significant documentary tradition can be 
traced back to the year 1896 and the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 (Botha, 2012: 9). In 1913 
the real estate and insurance tycoon, Isadore William Schlesinger, formed African Amalgamated 
Theatres' Trust, Ltd. and proceeded to establish a monopoly over practically every aspect of 
South African cinema (Saks, 2010: 11). The Schlesinger Empire's domination remained almost 
completely unchecked from 1913 to 1956, barring a temporary loss of control when sound films 
were initially introduced to South Africa (Botha, 2012: 26). 
 
By the 1930s the global dominance of Hollywood Product had resulted in a substantial 
diminishment of South African film production (Botha, 2012: 11; Saks, 2010: 12). South African 
productions gained newfound popularity after the release of Sarie Marais and Moedertjie, the 
first South African films with sound, in 1931 (2012: 26). Audience growth corresponded with the 
ascendancy of Afrikaner nationalism in the wider country, thus nationalist themes and motifs 
grew more and more conspicuous with every new Afrikaans language-film that was released 
(Botha, 2012: 29). While there was a boost in the popularity of South African cinema as a result 
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of the arrival of the sound film, the majority of films that were being screened in the country 
during this period were predominantly of American origin (Botha, 2012: 29).  
 
Censorship was a major problem in these early days; in 1930 an Entertainments censorship bill 
was introduced to South Africa which enabled the state to control the advertisement and 
exhibition of films in the country (Botha, 2012: 30). The bill also provisioned for the creation of 
a national board of censors, from whom approval had to be sought before any film or 
advertisement for a film could be shown publicly (Botha, 2012: 30-31). In this respect, South 
African cinema in the first few decades of its existence had to compete with Hollywood products 
for screen time and when local films were made they often had to utilize nationalist conventions 
and themes in order to get local audiences to pay attention. Added to this debacle local 
filmmakers had to avoid getting on the bad side of the censorship board. 
 
Schlesinger's domination of the industry only ended in 1956 because the famed Hollywood 
company Twentieth Century Fox bought out the Schlesinger's cinematic Empire (Botha, 2012: 
11). The local film industry also received a boost when director Jamie Uys was able to convince 
the nationalist party government to provide a financial subsidy to help in the creation of local 
films (Botha, 2012: 11-12). A regulated subsidy system was introduced around 1956 (Botha, 
2012: 12) This action may have helped to spur the growth of the local industry but in the long 
run it also lead indirectly to the intense fragmentation of the industry (Botha, 2012: 11-12). The 
introduction of this subsidy system was the start of a period of collaboration between big 
business and government with the express purpose of manipulating cinema in South Africa to 
serve ideological purposes (Botha, 2012: 12).  
 
By the 1960s, the local film industry was predominantly one in which Afrikaans productions had 
pride of place (ibid.). The white Afrikaans audiences of the day, who had been economically 
uplifted as a result of various apartheid machinations, was sufficiently large and monolithic 
enough to ensure that so long as a film "provided light entertainment and dealt with Afrikaner 
reality and beliefs" then it would earn enough money to break even (ibid.).  
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Segregationist laws and other forms of structural racism up to this point had resulted in the 
wholesale exclusion of black South Africans from practically every meaningful aspect of the 
film industry (Botha, 2012: 35).  Even though the cinema had been introduced to South Africa in 
the final years of the 19th century, black South Africans were essentially deprived of the cinema 
in both rural areas and in 'black' townships (ibid.). 40 years after the birth of cinema, there were 
only four cinema halls for black patrons left open in the entire country (ibid.). A small number of 
community-based film programs did exist, but these were predominantly organised by 
philanthropists and missionaries who collaborated with the mining industry in the hope of 
"moralising the leisure time of Africans" (ibid.).  
 
This is not to say that all films made in South Africa during this period adopted apartheid's 
cinematic mantra. There were a small number of films in the 1940s and 1950s that attempted to 
show South African society in a way that portrayed some modicum of lived reality for black 
South Africans (ibid.). The aforementioned constraints that black South Africans faced in the 
South African film industry meant that the responsibility of trying to show some approximation 
of the truth, and perhaps be critical of the system fell upon the shoulders upon a small number of 
white independent filmmakers (ibid.).  
 
One of the earliest examples of these films was the 1949 film, African Jim – Jim Comes to 
Jo’burg, which was directed by Donald Swanson and Eric Rutherford (Botha, 2012: 35). This 
film and others like Zoltan Korda's Cry The Beloved Country (1951) tried to show hidden or 
perhaps silenced aspects of South African society (with varying results) (ibid.). However, the 
film that was most explicitly critical of the apartheid system from this era was Lionel Rogosin's 
1959 film Come Back, Africa (Botha, 2012; 38).  
 
The situation for alternative cinema had slightly improved by the 1970s, but the problems that 
had typified the industry in the 1960s continued to manifest themselves in new and frustrating 
ways (Botha, 2012: 69). The rising turmoil of the political situation in the country did little to 
change the way white audiences consumed feature films as escapism continued to be the norm 
(ibid.). There were small signs of hope in the subversive films that auteurs like Jans Rautenbach 
and Manie Van Rensburg were making, but they had to tread lightly to avoid censorship (ibid.).  
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Subsequently, the conservative audiences who most needed to watch thought-provoking films 
about South African society, spurned these rare cinematic jewels in favour of films that 
portrayed Afrikaners as "chatty, heart-warming and lovable" which meant that "their conception 
of socio-political reality was confined to the conventions of Afrikaans melodramas about 
mismatched couples who had to overcome obstacles on the path to true love" (ibid.).  
 
A total lack of audience development was not the only problem to manifest itself in the 1970s, 
the old spectre of censorship continued to pose a threat for both local and international films 
(ibid.). While many film cultures around the world were experiencing something of a renaissance 
in terms of the subject matter their films were engaging with, South Africa still had to put up 
with harsh moral censorship (ibid.). Botha argues that this environment prevented South African 
audiences from seeing international films such as "Fellini‟s Satyricon (1969), Bertolucci‟s Last 
Tango in Paris (1972) and Pontecorvo‟s The Battle of Algiers (1966)", the type of films that he 
believes "would have challenged [South Africans'] conceptions of sexuality, politics, race and 
aesthetics" (ibid.). 
 
The 1970s did produce a significant change to the South African cinematic landscape in the form 
of a purported Bantu film industry (Botha, 2012: 12). The Bantu film industry was a further 
contributor to the severe fragmentation of the South African film industry (ibid.). The reasoning 
behind the formation of this industry was predominantly economic as opposed to any kind of 
softening of political attitudes (Botha, 2012: 115). Rather the primary motivating factor was the 
introduction of the B scheme, a new government subsidy system, which made funds available for 
inexperienced white filmmakers to go out and make so-called ethnic language films on shoe-
string budgets (Botha, 2012: 115). The white filmmakers involved in these films were often 
oblivious to the nuances of black culture and more often than not did not speak any form of 
Nguni language; the actors thus had to translate their own dialogue (ibid.).  
 
Furthermore, this large number of poor quality B-scheme films did almost nothing to challenge 
the dominant myths that South African cinema under apartheid had been perpetuating. In this 
respect, the films that were created under this scheme portrayed black urbanisation as "uniformly 
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negative and homeland life as more fitting" (Botha, 2012: 115). The Bantu Film industry 
eventually suffered the same fate as the other fragmented entities that made up South African 
film industry during apartheid (Botha, 2012: 13). This is because "any film that managed to be 
made reflecting in any way the South African society in turmoil was banned by the state, or 
received no distribution whatsoever, and thus did not qualify for any film subsidy." (Botha, 2012: 
13).  
 
By 1980, the political violence in the country resembled something akin to a civil war, and by 
the middle of the decade South Africa's economy had become threatened by the divestment 
campaign and the widespread departure of multi-national capital (Tomaselli, 1989: 9). Tomaselli 
argues that by December 1986, it had become apparent that the government was not going to 
concede to any demands for change and that all the talk of "reform" during this period was 
simply a delaying tactic (ibid.). He summarizes the mainstream film industry's reaction to these 
events thusly:   
 
While the English-language South African press demanded the release of Mandela and the 
legalization of the ANC, much of the film industry blithely continued as if nothing was 
happening. The Producers Institute vehemently objected to an issue of The SAFTTA Journal 
which focused on the cultural boycott, while Agfa-Gevaert, a German producer of film stock, 
withdrew its advertising from the Journal in protest (Tomaselli, 1989: 9) 
 
One of the reasons for the mainstream industry's general lack of interest in making any kind of 
attempt at a critical cinema was the lucrative film boom that had occurred in the South African 
industry at this point in time (Botha, 2012: 13). The boom occurred because large tax 
concessions were offered by the government, which made film investment a very appealing 
financial prospect (ibid.). Botha notes that "several hundred films were made, mostly inferior 
imitations of American genre" and that the "majority of these tax-shelter films did not reflect any 
recognisable socio-political reality" (ibid.). This system lead to substantial self-censorship on the 
part of filmmakers because financiers who had gotten into the film industry to take advantage of 
the tax-breaks, would not risk their investments on films that would run the risk of banning or 
audience rejection (Botha, 2012: 121). However, this tax-shelter scheme collapsed at the end of 
the 1980s and this part of the South African industry was essentially destroyed (Botha, 2012: 13).  
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The 1980s were not simply defined by this general lack of interest in progressive cinema, film 
historians also point to the years of 1986/1987 as a turning point for the industry for a number of 
reasons (Botha, 2012: 122). One of the primary reasons was the emergence of a number of 
filmmakers who were not associated with the mainstream film industry and instead went about 
making films about the lives of the majority of South Africa's population (Botha, 2012: 13). This 
movement started to operate in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, but it arrived in earnest 
around the years of 1986/1987 (ibid.).  
 
Tomaselli notes that this period was also auspicious because for one of the first times in the 
South African cinematic history, a film that was critical of the apartheid system was screened in 
cinemas (1989: 10). The film was Darrell Roodt's A Place of Weeping (1987) and it explored the 
poor treatment that some black farm workers received at the hands of some white farmers (Botha, 
2012: 123). According to Botha, it was part of a collection of films that made up "a cinema that 
gave a voice to those who were previously marginalised by apartheid" (ibid.).  
 
Botha argues that the films of this revival can be called progressive film texts because they 
consciously critiqued the apartheid system (2012: 14). This critique was either done through the 
cinematic recovery of silenced narratives about South Africa's past, such as Darrel Roodt's 
Jobman (1989) or though an exploration of the contemporary political situation, such as the 
events depicted in Oliver Schmitz' landmark film Mapantsula (1989) (ibid.). However, just 
because progressive films were finally being made after the 1986/1987 alternative film revival, it 
did not mean they were being seen by South African audiences (Botha, 2012: 125). Whilst new 
avenues for funding had been opened as a result of the aforementioned events, substantial 
problems of censorship remained a thorn in the side of progressive filmmakers (Botha, 2012: 
123-124).  
 
Botha asserts that the fact that good directors of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s kept on making 
films that challenged the status quo (even though they suffered from censorship and uninterested 
audiences) is a testament to the talent and ability that South African cinema has always had 
(2012: 125). He goes on to say that the progressive films of the 1980s were of particular 
importance because it is from these cinematic texts that one can draw the iconography and 
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symbolism of a truly national cinema as opposed to "the diversions produced by the Afrikaans-
language cinema of the 1970s, the Bantu film industry and the tax-shelter films" (Botha, 2012: 
14).  
 
It becomes clear that the history of the South African film industry is one that is characterised by 
fragmentation, crass commercialism and racial exclusionism. These are problems that continue 


























5. State Funding in the Rainbow Nation 
 
Saks argues that the landmark elections of 1994 were a nationalist moment in which the 
mediums of cinema and television were both conscripted to try to build a new society out of the 
fragments of the old one (2010: 13-14). However, after the relatively peaceful transition from 
apartheid to a constitutional democracy had taken place, the issue of state funding loomed large 
in the film industry.  
 
5.1 The Pre-NFVF Funding Climate 
 
The year 1994 was an auspicious year for South African cinema; the Human Sciences Research 
Council (HSRC) completed a thorough study on how to go about restructuring the entire South 
African film industry and forwarded it to the newly established Department of Arts, Culture, 
Science and Technology (DACST) (Botha, 2012: 15). The HSRC research team recommended 
that there should be a statutory body established to administer financial aid to the local film 
industry and that commercial viability should not be the only factor in deciding what project gets 
government support (ibid.). It was believed that a "film industry that is focused exclusively on 
maximising profit would inevitably become shallow and artless" (ibid.).  
 
Botha notes that an interim film fund was announced by the DACST in May 1996 to replace the 
old funding schemes that had either failed or had been discontinued (2012: 165). This film fund 
had the responsibility of annually distributing R10 million amongst various projects until a 
permanent film statutory body could be established (ibid.). In 1996, the Department of Arts and 
Culture (DAC) published the White Paper on Film "after a protracted period of consultation and 
debate between stakeholders, politicians, cultural workers, and filmmakers" (Saks, 2010: 33). 
 
Saks argues that the White Paper was the embodiment of the country's policy of cinematic 
restructuring, this process of restructuring was defined in the White Paper as being "integral to 
the success of the democratic project (2010: 33). She summarises some of the issues related to 
the White Paper thusly: 
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What strikes one in reading the paper is the fluidity with which it combines the 
"fighting rhetoric" of postcolonial discourse with phrases that could have emerged 
from a reader on neoliberal economic policy. No distinction is made, for example, 
between the concept of a national cinema that "will enable South African audiences 
to see their own interpretations of their experience and stories reflected on local 
screens" and the creation of a film industry based "on a sound commercial footing in 
order to enable it to become internationally competitive (ibid.). 
 
Saks argues that this somewhat bifurcated definition of what role cinema should play in post-
apartheid South Africa continues in the second chapter of the White Paper (ibid.). The second 
chapter highlights the importance of cinema as a form of cultural expression and as a means of 
exploring "social meanings" (ibid.). In something of a contradictory fashion, it also refers to the 
cinema as a means of generating substantial employment, income and providing opportunities 
for investment (ibid.). The cinema is also credited in a later paragraph of the White Paper as 
having the potential to promote the country as a potential destination for tourists, as well as 
location that could be used by international film and advertising productions (ibid.). The low 
costs in comparison due to the United States and the European Union would apparently be a 
benefit in favour of the South African industry (ibid.).  
 
The White Paper does not take a clear position on what type of cinema post-apartheid South 
Africa should produce because it is not a manifesto (Saks, 2010: 34). Saks argues that contains 
elements that makes one think that it‟s a manifesto, but the White Paper is in fact a state paper 
that is meant to satisfy diverse constituencies (ibid.). As a paper that emerged in a post-apartheid 
context, a context in which everybody is supposed to have a voice under the new dispensation; it 
has to speak for the interests of the film industry, the interests of the state and at least attempt to 
talk on behalf of the disempowered majority of the population (ibid.). 
 
5.2 The National Film and Video Foundation (NFVF) 
 
Saks argues that the White Paper mandated that a film foundation be created in order to pursue a 
number of objectives in the construction of a film industry that would take appropriate actions in 
the post-apartheid context (2010: 34). This film foundation would have a number of duties to 
perform; it would ensure that any available state funding was distributed, it would promote the 
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South African film industry, it would ensure that a diversity of film genres and types is 
maintained without the emphasis being solely on commercial value and it would ensure that 
cinema culture in South Africa grew (ibid.). This foundation would not be under the direct 
control of the government however, which was an important condition considering the 
problematic history of film subsidies in South Africa, which were often incoherent, generally 
corrupt and almost always racist (ibid.).  
 
The promulgation of the National Film and Video Foundation Act 73 of 1997 lead to the 
formation of the National Film and Video Foundation (NFVF) (Botha, 2012: 160). By 1999, the 
NFVF had finally been established to support the South African film industry, and by 2000 it had 
started to allocate funding (Botha, 2012: 166). Saks argues that the NFVF holds to a central 
ideology that: 
 
... models transformation in postcolonial, nationalist terms and interprets filmmakers as 
deserving of state patronage because they are cultural workers participating in the 
construction of South African cinema/media. Its view of cinema is prescriptive, idealistic, 
artisanal, and auteurist (2010: 7) 
 
However, adequate state funding in the post-apartheid filmmaking context has long been a 
problem (Saks, 2010: 38). One of the factors behind this problem is the recurring narrative in 
South African society that asks whether the funding of the arts and culture is a good use of 
resources, especially when so many societal problems are left over from apartheid (Saks, 2010: 
30-31). This lack of funding has significantly weakened the NFVF's ability to carry out its 
objectives, especially considering it is dependent on support from the government and it is 
unlikely that the Foundation would be able to find financial support from other sources (Saks, 
2010: 38). 
 
Saks asserts that the NFVF was initially framed in terms of the ANC's government's first 
economic program, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was run from 
1994 to 1996 (ibid.). The RDP placed an emphasis on the government ensuring that there was 
movement towards a more equitable distribution of income (ibid.). To achieve the RDP's goals, 
there would have to be a paradigm shift with investment flowing into the poorest sectors of the 
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economy and personal income tax becoming substantially more progressive (Treffry-Goatley, 
2010: 2). Subsequently, the overall principle of the RDP was that "redistribution was a principal 
and would not be held hostage to growth" (Saks, 2010: 39).  
 
However, the RDP's days were numbered because the last quarter of 1996 saw the coming of 
"Growth, Employment And Redistribution" (GEAR), a neoliberal development policy 
orchestrated by the then Vice-President Thabo Mbeki (Saks, 2010: 39; Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 2). 
Saks asserts that GEAR "turned the RDP on its head by placing (G)rowth first, (E)mployment 
second, (A)nd (R)edistribution last" (Saks, 2010: 39). However, to attain the growth that GEAR 
needed, there would have to be significant reforms, reforms that were not conducive to the 
NFVF supporting a film industry that was concerned with more parochial or artistic endeavours 
(ibid.).  
 
Under the GEAR reforms, the NFVF was subsequently urged to fundraise in a more proactive 
manner, the foundation also became more interested with marketing the South African film 
industry to the rest of the world and less concerned with the artistic merits of the films that were 
being made (Saks, 2010: 39). International co-productions in particular were emphasised in this 
economic climate (ibid.).  The NFVF thus has had to try and align utopian goals written during 
the RDP period with economic policy written during the GEAR period (Saks, 2010: 38-39).  
 
Treffry-Goatley notes the NFVF also published a value charter, it was a document based upon 
the 1996 White Paper and it served as the NFVF's blueprint for the continued development of the 
post-apartheid film industry (2010: 5). This value charter listed the NFVF's vision thusly: 
 
[Our vision is] a South African film and video industry that mirrors and represents the nation, 
sustains commercial viability, encourages development and provides a medium through 
which the creative and technical talents of South Africans are able to reach the world (2002: 
1)  
 
Treffry-Goatley argues that this vision contains many ideological strands from a number of 
different interested parties and that the various competing interests show the attempts to "to 
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marry the rectification of apartheid-derived injustices with a neoliberal, export driven paradigm" 
(2010: 5).  
 
In August 2001, the NFVF hosted a film indaba (an industry meeting) to present their research 
findings to the various stakeholders and industry players of the South African film and video 
industry (Botha, 2012: 172). The research had been performed on a variety of matters involving 
the local industry, with issues relating to film production and training and development being 
discussed along with the way forward for the industry (ibid.). Saks argues that the following 
suggestions for state interventions were made during the indaba regarding how the NFVF could 
potentially increase its funding:   
 
The value-added tax (VAT) could be collected on cinema tickets, there could be a 
withholding tax on foreign films screened in the country, a withholding tax on royalties paid 
to foreign film distributors, and a clear monitoring of investment companies to prevent abuse 
of South African incentives to produce films of benefit to the industry (as had happened in 
the eighties) (2010: 39-40). 
 
However, none of these suggestions were implemented, and by the time of the 2005 Film Indaba, 
the NFVF was in full "business mode" (Saks, 2010: 40). The aforementioned value charter had 
been "transmuted" into a "value chain", which Saks describes as an organogram that "looked 
more like a business plan for the industry than a developmental strategy for an emerging film 
industry" (ibid.). This period was defined by a new system for getting funding from the 
government, a concept needed to be backed up by its supposed potential for distribution (ibid.). 
Thus getting distribution for a product was a prerequisite for getting funding for the product 
(ibid.). Funding was then followed by the manufacture of the product and finally the marketing 
of the product (ibid.).     
 
Distribution in this sense does not simply mean a run on the cinema circuit but could also include 
broadcasting, video or non-conventional sites such as schools; churches, halls, festivals and 
universities (ibid.). In this regard, a project needed to be defined and aimed at a viable audience 
(ibid.). The word "viable" in this sense does not only refer to financial viability, because not all 
projects are concerned with profit (ibid.). For example a project dealing with health issues would 
quantify success by the size of the audience reached as opposed to profits earned (ibid.).  
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However there is always a difficulty in defining the audience for a project because such an 
endeavour requires data that is quantifiable (ibid.). Therefore, unless there is some way of 
quantifying the potential audience, it is highly unlikely that any distributor, whether they are 
conventional or alternative, will provide temporal or financial resources in distributing a product 
(ibid.). Projects that do not align with conventionality subsequently run into serious troubles 
because it is hard to obtain measurable data on innovation (ibid.).  
 
Similarly, if a filmmaker is attempting to diversify the country's cinematic culture and wants to 
develop an audience for alternative cinematic projects, then one cannot attempt to measure the 
audience potential before an audience has developed in response to alternative cinematic projects 
(ibid.). Or as Saks puts it: "there is no way to measure the audience potential for projects that do 
not yet exist" (ibid.).  
 
Saks argues that these issues do not point to what the NFVF terms a "dependency syndrome" in 
which people are waiting for the government to do all the work for them, but significant 
obstacles on the road to empowering talented filmmakers who have potential to make films with 
new and exciting elements but have yet to be given the financial opportunity to do so (ibid.). 
Furthermore, without upfront funding a prospective filmmaker can't do research as to whether 
there is a potential audience for their work (ibid.). New filmmakers and producers could in 
theory attain private funding for their work from some other sources, but Saks argues that such 
an occurrence is highly unlikely as "private capital" is aversive to risk (ibid.). The lack of 
experience and professional training in the case of some filmmakers also makes it unlikely for 
funding to become available for newcomers to the industry or those who wish to make films in 
new ways (ibid.). Saks argues that this situation is made worse by "the shortage of black capital 
that might be persuaded to take a risk" (2010: 40). She further defines the problem with 
distribution circuits thusly: 
 
Distribution (which includes exhibition) circuits are conservative and committed to the 
bottom line. Since local films have done badly at the box office, they are not willing to take a 
risk unless forced to do so as in the case of local content mandates for broadcasting. The 
NFVF is the only advocate for the disempowered (in terms of film and filmmaking), but it 
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appears to have abandoned that role, acting instead on behalf of the industry as a "service 
deliverer to the broader industry," a "strategic partner in the industry." (Saks, 2010: 40-41) 
 
Saks references Martin Botha, who was the head of the HSRC report which initially put forth the 
suggestion of a film foundation (2010: 41). Botha asserted that a "crude commercialisation" was 
occurring at the NFVF, and in a 2005 interview he asserted that projects were being rejected as 
"non-commercial" and that funding applicants were being asked for "rushes" and "pitches" of 
new projects that were 25 words or less (Saks, 2010: 41). 
 
The NFVF's funding limitations have affected the accomplished directors as well as the 
newcomers, Botha notes the example of Ross Devenish, whose films the The Guest (1977) and 
Marigolds in August (1979) received international acclamation (2012: 190). Devenish's script 
based upon Zakes Mda's novel, Ways of Dying (2005) has been rejected for funding by the 
NFVF (Botha, 2012: 190; Saks, 2010: 41). Botha claimed in the aforementioned 2005 interview 
that there was a marginalisation of non-mainstream cinema occurring and that a new avant-garde 
cinema needed to emerge in the "name of progressivity" (ibid.).   
 
Treffry-Goatley notes the massive impact that additional financing could have on the industry by 
referring to the example of the Special Feature Film Production Fund (2010: 74). It was fund of 
R35 million rand which was granted to the NFVF by the Department of Arts and Culture 
between the years 2004 and 2006 (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 74). She notes that this fund produced 
a record for feature film production in 2005, with the number of films produced practically 
doubling from seven to thirteen (ibid.). Botha likewise argues that there was a revival of the 
feature film industry during this period, with a great deal of South African feature films being 
submitted to the 2004 Cannes Film Festival (2012: 182). Botha argues that the high point of this 
"South African New Wave" was Gavin Hood's 2005 film Tsotsi winning the Oscar for Best 
Foreign Language Film of the Year at 2006 Academy Awards (2012: 188). However the DAC 
did not renew the Special Feature Film Production Fund, which stifled this flourishing of South 
African feature filmmaking and resulted in a substantial decline in production (Botha, 2012: 188).   
 
Botha asserts that by the year 2008, two contrasting developments became readily apparent 
(2012: 191). The grants from the NFVF which are meant to constitute government funding of the 
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film industry remain as Botha puts it: "hopelessly inadequate" (ibid.). The second development 
was that a new generation of filmmakers have managed to succeed in spite of the funding climate 
by attaining alternate funding for their projects. Some of these projects have even gone on to be 
watched by audiences and enjoy mainstream success (ibid.) One of these projects, Ralph Ziman's 
2008 crime film Jerusalema shall be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7. 
 
Rainbowism's effects on the NFVF can possibly be seen in the way that during the first decade of 
the new South Africa, the films that were made had not covered certain topics with a great deal 
of depth; such as the structural causes of ongoing poverty and homelessness and the continuing 
hatred between South Africa's peoples (Saks, 2010: 9). Saks highlights an issue which is at the 
crux of this dissertation, namely that there has been a widespread inability or unwillingness on 
the part of the state-subsidised films to critique the state or "address ongoing white racism and 
black rage as conditions of society and subjectivity"(ibid.). She goes on to say that while post-
apartheid South Africa might not have developed a cinema that is capable of performing this 
critique of the state, or formulating a response to the hatred and rage that is leftover from South 
Africa's violent past (Saks, 2010: 10). It has managed to produce a "tapestry of voices" which has 
been a contributor to the process of making the public sphere more democratic (ibid.).   
 
However, the question remains as to whether this broader tapestry of voices are truly being given 
the opportunity to let their voices be heard if the main recourse for state funding has been co-
opted by a type of "crude commercialism" (Saks, 2010: 40-41). A commercialism that does not 
allow for the creation of products that will work towards building audiences or diversifying 
South African cinematic culture (ibid.). To phrase this problem in the form of a question: If a 
filmmaker's voice is being heard, but they are being told what to say by the state then what is the 
point of speaking?  The state might reply that: "money talks". This is an anecdotal explanation as 
to why the film industry has fully embraced a role as a “service industry” to the global film 






5.3 The "Service" Industry 
 
Treffry-Goatley argues that while some aspects of the local film industry might be perceived as 
failures, the "service" side of the industry has been a massive success (2010: 63).  The "service" 
industry refers to the logistical and technical support that the industry gives to international 
productions (ibid.). There are a number of reasons for South Africa becoming a premium 
attraction for foreign productions; there is the country's stable and warm climate, the existing 
physical and legal infrastructure (ibid.). As well as the ready availability of skilled cast and crew 
and the world-class production and post-production facilities (ibid.). The NFVF‟s 2013 South 
African Film Industry Economic Baseline Study Report, which they commissioned accounting 
firm Deloitte to perform, summarises this situation thusly: 
 
Films which encourage viewers to visit the country or site where films were shot, which is 
often labelled “film-induced tourism” or “movie-induced tourism”... can become the catalyst 
for investment tourism and can bolster additional movies setting their location within that 
area. South Africa has a well established reputation for having a good climate, stunning 
locations and a generous rebate structure. This has led to a strategy of encouraging films and 
producers to locate themselves in South Africa (2013: 32). 
 
Treffry-Goatley notes that the success of this sector of the industry has had the effect of 
encouraging the state to further invest in industry infrastructure in order to stimulate growth and 
increase the industry's competitiveness (2010: 63). She asserts that "[t]his infrastructure and 
relevant state incentives have assisted the production of local films" (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 63).  
 
Treffry-Goatley argues that the continuing problem in the South African industry is the fact that 
local films have generally performed poorly at the box office, with about half of the feature films 
produced between 2000-2007 failing to recoup 10 percent of their production costs at the local 
box office (2010: 63-64). However, she also notes that there have been small glimmers of hope 
at the box office with ticket-sales gradually improving and 2008 being the most profitable year in 
a long time (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 64). She asserts that these improvements at the box office 
can be linked to the success of local comedy features like Henk Pretorius' film Bakgat (2008), 
Gray Hofmeyr's Mr. Bones 2: Back From the Past and Ralph Ziman's gangster film Jerusalema 
(2008) (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 65).  
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5.4 The Industrial Development Corporation (Media and Motion Picture Division) 
 
The Media and Motion Picture Division of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
located under the auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) does not concern itself 
with the motion picture as an art form. This is because the DTI sees motion pictures as a 
commodity to be traded like any other (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 72). The IDC is far more 
concerned with providing financing for productions that will attract "international players" (Saks, 
2010: 7-8). A project is feasible for the IDC when South Africa is the shooting location and an 
international market can be found for the project, a goal that they call "globalizing from both 
ends" (ibid.).  
 
In terms of funding, the IDC provides a maximum of 49% of the production budget on a 
investment of R1 million rand minimum (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 86). Financial assistance from 
the IDC usually comes in the form of "loan finance, by means of equity, quasi-equity, 
commercial loans, wholesale finance, share warehousing, export/import finance, short-term trade 
finance, and guarantees" (Silinda, 2008: 25). This IDC funding usually goes towards co-
productions, a form of film production that has become very popular in a global filmmaking 
environment that continues to see the production, distribution and exhibition of films dominated 
by a seemingly endless supply of Hollywood product (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 89). The 
production models of international co-productions often take the form of financial agreements 
where the budget of a film is split between two or more international partners (ibid.). The IDC 
receives more funding in terms of state finance than the NFVF and more of this money has been 
spent on foreign films than local films (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 92; Saks, 2010: 7-8). This has 
been done in the hopes of getting the aforementioned international players (such as big name 
directors, producers and acting talent) involved in the South African industry (ibid.). 
 
However, Treffry-Goatley goes on to say that there are cultural considerations to take into 
account along with the economic factors that come with the IDC's favourite model of film 
production (2010: 93). She says that the IDC's funding policy is geared towards films with high-
production values and commercialised productions for export (ibid.). She argues that in the case 
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of co-productions, where a number of interested parties are making films for global markets, one 
can see that these films encourage a form of cultural blandness and a certain loss of parochial 
specificity (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 94). 
 
In the case of South African stories made as co-productions, they are being made culturally bland 
to appeal to the widest possible audience, but at the same time Rainbowism is the selling point 
that makes them unique. This statement obviously requires some elaboration; Saks argues that 
South Africa's "moment of rapture" in 1994 not only affected the country and the African 
continent, but it made the entire world sit up and take notice (2010: 14). The "South African 
miracle", as the early events of the halo-period became known, attained significant "global 
cultural capital" (ibid.) The Truth and Reconciliation Commission added to this global cultural 
capital, because according to Saks:  
 
Unlike previous truth commissions, South Africa's TRC was a self-consciously public and 
open performance, conducted in full view of the world's media on stages in public venues 
(churches and town halls) and in front of an audience. Those not present were able to hear 
the proceedings word for word on the radio and television. This fact, plus the ability of the 
Commission to grant conditional amnesty to the perpetrators in exchange for full and honest 
disclosure of crimes committed as part of a political agenda, gave the proceedings the sort of 
drama one associates with cinema or the theatre (2010: 84). 
 
There have been various criticisms of the TRC, but Saks argues that while many of the criticisms 
of the TRC are trenchant, they does not nullify the commissions achievements and they not make 
inert the prestige that the country earned locally and around the world for its dignified political 
transition to democracy (2010: 88). Saks goes on to say that if South Africa has "become an 
imaginary site for the West, a place in which the tired narratives of modernity can be replayed 
with different and perhaps more optimistic outcomes, this was in no small part due to the TRC" 
(ibid.). In this respect, even though South Africa might have has lost some of its lustre in the 
eyes of the West as time went on and societal problems piled up (Saks, 2010: 89). Saks 
references Marsha Kinder who alleges that South Africa still maintains "considerable 
transformational capital" in a world that longs to see some form of modern-day happy ending to 
a seemingly-intransigent conflict (ibid.). This is one reason as to why drama films centred on the 
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TRC and the apartheid past have been regularly made as co-productions with Hollywood stars in 
leading roles (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 87).  
 
Therefore, many drama films which are international co-productions of South African stories can 
be seen to employ some discourse of Rainbowism as a means of tapping into this 
"transformational capital". Rainbowism in a co-production involving South Africa's apartheid 
past allows for all the drama associated with this painful past, whilst ensuring that even if the 
ending isn't happy, then there is at least a form of closure due to the use of a restorative 
Hollywood film structure (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 53). The restorative structure implies to both 
international audiences and local audiences that a clear line can be drawn between the apartheid 
and post-apartheid era. It also implies to viewers that the change in political system and the work 
of TRC was the definitive end of South Africa's racial issues, as opposed to the beginning of 
South Africa's long journey towards healing and reconciliation.   
 
However, Treffry-Goatley notes that co-productions are often failures on the local market, one of 
the reasons for this might be related to genre because by far the most popular films in South 
Africa belong to the comedy genre (2010: 95). Whilst the majority of co-productions during the 
period of 1994 to 2009 were drama films (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 96). She argues that is possible 
that perhaps:  
 
... the dominance of the drama genre in co-productions is an indication of the export-driven 
nature of such productions, because while comedies are often parochial, dramas have a 
greater potential to travel across cultures since audiences are able to identify with a 
character's emotional journey. Nevertheless, this generic choice has certainly not increased 
the popularity of co-productions with local audiences (ibid.).  
 
This is not to say that drama is the only legitimate or authentic way to look at South Africa's 
painful history and its continuing effects on post-apartheid society (Bisschoff, 2009: 451). 
Bisschoff argues that "the use of comedy and humour in recent South African films hints at the 
possibility that a genre is also developing that does not necessarily deal with post-apartheid 
issues in a dramatic way" (ibid.). While it is possible to extrapolate that the loss of cultural 
specificity in these films possibly puts local audiences off going to see these dramatic co-
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productions in general. Another factor that contributes to the failure of these films might be an 
issue of post-apartheid audience development.  
 
5.5 The Issue of Audiences 
 
The 2013 baseline study states that South Africa has a cinema-going audience that consists of 
approximately 5.5 million individuals who go to the cinema an average of 4.5 times per year 
(NFVF, 2013: 44). This relatively small number of cinema attendees significantly limits the 
revenue earned from this exhibition platform (ibid.). Added to these challenges, there is a 
continued lack of a cinema-going culture amongst South Africa's black population, who by-and-
large are still limited by apartheid spatial development and other issues described in the historical 
contextualisation found in Chapter 4 (ibid.).      
 
The baseline study states that a further reason for this lack of cinema attendance amongst the 
majority of the population is the fact that there is a lack of relevant content (ibid.). The current 
demographics who go to the cinemas seek out Western content ahead of locally produced content; 
the majority of the box-office sales emerge out of this scenario (ibid.). The baseline study 
concludes after having had discussions with "black film producers, audiences and broadcasters" 
that "black audiences do not generally find this content culturally relevant and thus prefer to 
watch TV and purchase DVD‟s where content is colloquial" (ibid.). 
 
Therefore, if the majority of audience members in the country are white South Africans who 
benefited economically from apartheid and who have been exposed to a form of Rainbowism for 
nearly two decades. Then it seems unlikely that they will seek out cinematic texts which look 
back at the apartheid past, especially considering that Rainbowism seeks to reify the "now" by 
silencing the "then" of the past. At the same time the increasing numbers of black middle class 
people who go to the cinema obviously do not want to be reminded of the horrors of apartheid 
(Pickering in McCluskey, 2009: 185). This ties into developments in broader African cinema to a 
certain extent, Alexie Tcheuyap argues that post-colonial African directors have become more 
interested in entertaining audiences than reminding them of the "undeniably unhealthy 
experience" of colonialism (2011: 30).  
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5.6 Low-Budget and Digital Cinema 
 
There are number of developments in the industry that can be interpreted as challenging the 
neoliberal dominance of film production in South Africa (Botha, 2012: 249). One example is the 
alternative production model that emerged out of the growth of digital technology in the global 
film industry (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 102; Botha, 2012: 249) There has been a clear trend of 
low-budget digital films emerging in recent years, these films target the broader demographics of 
the population who have been under-serviced in terms of relevant content (NFVF, 2013: 38). 
Broadcasters and producers have seen that this market lay untapped and have rectified the 
situation by making a great number of productions which address everyday black realities in 
vernacular languages such as TsiVenda, IsiZulu and IsiXhosa (NFVF, 2013: 38; Young, 2013: 
online resource). The baseline report states that the "market for these low budget films is 
estimated at a maximum of R200 million (including distribution). Many of these productions are 
funded by broadcasters in return for TV rights, with the producers earning income from the DVD 
rights" (NFVF, 2013: 38). Some successful examples of this trend are MNet‟s Bubblegum Films; 
Chicco Twala‟s self-produced films, ETV‟s Ekasi Films and Ekasi Movie Nights (NFVF, 2013: 
38). However the term "Bubblegum Films" is often used interchangeably to describe all the low-
budget vernacular films in this category. The baseline study states that "[t]his is a sector that is 
set to grow provided it continues to get funding and the sector can survive the impacts of piracy 
(NFVF, 2013: 39)"  
 
Along with the aforementioned low-budget films targeted at the black majority there is a 
flourishing Afrikaans-language low-budget cinema known as "Hartiwood" (Young, 2013: online 
resource). The name comes from the fact that these films are primarily shot in areas around the 
Hartbeesport Dam (ibid.). These Afrikaans-language films tell Afrikaans stories that are in 
recognisable in some way to middle-class Afrikaners and are screened close to where the target 
audience lives (ibid.). Botha argues that these films, examples of which include the box-office 
successes Poena is Koning (2007) and Bakgat (2008), continue the escapist tradition that 
characterised Afrikaans cinema during the 1970s (2012: 191).  
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Thus it remains to be seen if a critical or art cinema emerges out of either the Bubblegum films 
or the low-budget Afrikaans cinema. When one considers that both these types of cinema are 
premised upon the repetition of the familiar themes and plot-points, it seems unlikely that the 
funders of these films will risk alienating consumers by not giving them exactly what they want. 
In the case of the bubblegum films in particular, it seems unlikely that many broadcasters and 
producers would support experimentation with form and narrative when there is fierce 
competition from other bubblegum films. Furthermore, while low-budget digital filmmaking 
allows more people to be making films in the industry, the small-budgets only allow for certain 
kinds of stories to be told.   
 
The baseline study does propose the "development of a separate Film Incentive for low budget 
films targeting the broader demographic" (NFVF, 2013: 49). However, considering the extent to 
which the NFVF has continued to align itself with commercialism it seems unlikely that this film 
incentive will do much to change the status quo in the low-budget side of the industry. Thus it is 
important to avoid seeing digital cinema as the "glorious solution" to the problems that continue 
to plague the post-apartheid film industry; instead this technology needs to be seen as an 
alternative model which will run parallel to already-established technologies (Botha, 2012: 249). 
In this regard, Treffry-Goatley asserts that even though: 
 
... digital technology might be seen as an ideal mechanism for democratisation of cinematic 
production and consumption in post-apartheid South Africa, this technology should not be 
viewed as a means for independent filmmakers to make it alone. State support is still needed 
to maintain diversity and to support sustainability, because, while digital technology has 
made cinema somewhat more accessible, the production, distribution and exhibition of 
motion pictures in South Africa remains monopolised, exclusive and inaccessible to the 
majority (2010: 117). 
 
5.7 The DTI Film Incentive 
 
Another mechanism of state support is the rebate initiative offered by the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) that was launched in 2004. This rebate initiative is also sometimes known as 
the DTI Film Incentive and its funding conditions are less stringent than the NFVF or those 
schemes which are offered by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) (Treffry-Goatley, 
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2011: 98). The film incentive has gone through a number of revisions since its launch, with the 
local industry now being supported as well as the production-for-export model of the service 
industry (ibid.). A fixed percentage of the funds spent on a production known as "Qualifying 
South African Production Expenditure" (QSAPE) is returned to the producer once the project is 
completed, or at predefined milestone (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 98; NFVF, 2013: 11). The 
producer(s) of a project stand to receive between 20% and 35% of the QSAPE in rebates through 
retrospective payments or the milestone option if they qualify for the scheme (NFVF, 2013: 35). 
However, they need to have 25% of the production budget in place before making the application, 
once they have secured 25% of the project's production budget they can make a provisional 
application to the DTI for the film incentive (NFVF, 2013: 35). Upon attaining 50% of the 
project's funding the producer can then apply to the IDC for their funding schemes (ibid.). 
However, the lack of upfront funding mean in many cases a film producer cannot get to the 25% 
mark which would allow them to make the application, thus many promising projects never 
progress into the production stage (ibid.).   
 
Treffry-Goatley argues that the DTI's commitment to addressing the issue of racial inequality in 
the industry is also evident in the way that all the companies applying for the DTI Film Incentive 
are expected to meet the government's requirements for Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) (2010: 99). There appears to have some substantial progress made 
towards greater parity in terms of employment equity as reflected in the data located in the 
baseline study (NFVF, 2013: 39). The study showed that in 2012, 66% of those individuals 
employed in the South African film industry belonged to the black majority, compared to 34% of 
the employees who belonged to the white minority (ibid.). The data also showed that 54% of 
those jobs that were skilled or semi-skilled were occupied by white individuals, compared to the 
46% of jobs which were occupied by black individuals (ibid.).  
 
However the baseline study makes no mention of the number of black directors or screenwriters 
working in the industry or to what extent black individuals are in positions of creative control. 
This lack of information about the creative or artistic side of the industry ties into a wider pattern 
of the NFVF privileging the economic side of the industry as opposed to the artistic side, an issue 
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which film worker Roger Young wrote about in an op-ed for the Mail and Guardian newspaper 
in 2013 (online resource).  
 
5.8 The Sediba System 
 
Young asserts that the fact that the report is centred upon economics and often references the 
export market, seems to suggest that the NFVF under the leadership of chief executive Zama 
Mkosi and head of development Clarence Hamiltion is driven primarily by economic concerns 
and the potential for export (2013: online resource). He notes how in a statement regarding the 
NFVF's trip to Cannes to promote South Africa as a shooting location (and not to screen films in 
competition) Mkosi said: "As we take our filmmakers and film projects there, our objective is 
very clear: we want to attract new markets and investments” (In Young, 2013: online resource). 
Furthermore, at the release of the baseline report, the then Minister of Arts and Culture, Paul 
Mashatile, said that the success of South African films abroad "...also indicates that the world 
wants to hear the South African story; a story of the triumph of the human spirit" (In Young, 
2013: online resource). Young believes that "this statement presents problems to filmmakers who 
might feel that there are other South African stories" (2013: online resource). 
 
This focus upon selling the South African story to the rest of the world, finds major 
representation in the Sediba Scriptwriter's Training and Development Programme; it is an NFVF 
initiative that was launched in 2005 that teaches both new and established filmmakers how to 
write and edit film scripts (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 81). The program is heavily associated with 
former CEO Eddie Mbalo and former Head of Production Ryan Haidarian (Mkosi and 
Hamilton's predecessors) who had significant influence on shaping South African cinematic 
stories until about 2011 (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 82; Young, 2013: online resource). Mbalo was 
quoted in 2009 as saying that "it is good for filmmakers to pursue their aspirations we need to 
find stories that can travel" and that "the best way is through script development and this is why 
we have the Sediba script development programme" (24).  
 
Treffry-Goatley argues that this statement implies that the script writing taught at the Sediba 
course is meant to help make films that "can appeal to a wide audience and relates to the 
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emphasis on commercial sustainability evident in the NFVF's vision for film industry 
development" (2010: 81). In an interview with Treffry-Goatley, Mbalo and Haidarian come 
across as very well intentioned, albeit slightly too dogmatic with an almost religious devotion to 
the classical three-act narrative structure and a mimicry of Hollywood forms (Treffry-Goatley, 
2010: 81-82). Haidarian admitted in the interview that the types of screenwriting books that 
Sediba used as exemplars of what made a story "work" did not look at alternative narrative 
structures (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 82). She goes on to say that Haidarian and Mbalo made a 
number of references to the seminal work of the anthropologist Joseph Campbell, The Hero with 
a Thousand Faces and that "Haidarian explained that the three-act [classic] narrative structure 
and the hero's journey are in fact, based on the results presented in this book, which proves the 
universality of story telling" (ibid.). 
 
While Treffry-Goatley's qualitative interviews conducted during the course of her 2010 PhD 
research found that "there was a relatively balanced response to the three-act narrative structure" 
(2010: 83). The same balanced response did not exist for Sediba, with  up to 71 percent of the 
respondents being mostly critical of the program with "the relevance and efficiency of short-term 
scriptwriting courses being questioned" as well as "fault being found with the way in which the 
programme is run" and "the programme being seen an infringement on creativity" (ibid.).  
 
Treffry-Goatley argues that it becomes evident that the NFVF has considerable influence over 
what kinds of stories that the state decides to fund (2010: 83). This kind of emphasis on 
commercial success and economic sustainability, sets South Africa apart from the state system in 
a country like France where the "purpose is to develop culture" (ibid.). In the interview with 
Treffry-Goatley, Haidarian asserted that by contrast the South African state is "investing in this 
sector of the economy because they think that this could be a real driver of the economy" (In 
Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 311). Thus as Treffry-Goatley argues:  
 
This method is differentiated from a content-led strategy where emphasis is placed on 
subsidy schemes and the individual artistic expression of the filmmaker. Given the 
increasing market-orientation of the post-apartheid film industry, it is likely that – in the 
absence of relevant intervention measures – black and white filmmakers alike, will find 
themselves tailoring their stories to suit the tastes of either foreign audiences ... or the 
existing national audience, which has seen little change since apartheid (2010: 83).  
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This homogenising approach to cinematic storytelling has the potential to infringe upon a 
filmmaker's constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 
85). Furthermore, if national cinematic production is informed by the hegemony of the market 
then innovation might be stifled and unique cinematic voices might end up being silenced 
(Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 84-85). Treffry-Goatley's assertion that the existing national audience 
has changed little since apartheid also causes substantial problems in relation to cinematic 
expression, as filmmakers might have to work within the "hegemonic national discourse of 
reconciliation and multiculturalism" in order to attract said audience (2010: 85).  
 
Treffry-Goatley also notes that in the aforementioned interview with Mbalo and Haidarian it 
emerged that the NFVF likes to fund projects that promote diversity and reconciliation (2010: 
85). Dovey argues that while many South African filmmakers choose to engage with the 
discourses of "critique and reconciliation" in their films, at the same time some filmmakers 
simply follow the available funding (2009: 55). For example, filmmaker Sechaba Morojele 
argues that a number of cinematic adaptations of South African literature emerged as a result of 
the NFVF specifically allocating funding for adaptations (ibid.). In the case of adaptations of 
Truth and Reconciliation literature, Morojele also raises the question as to why literary texts 
written by white South Africans such as Gillian Slovo's Red Dust (2000) and Antjie Krog's 
Country of My Skull (1998) are deemed the most appropriate to film when just as many black 
testimonies about the TRC exist (ibid.). He argues that writers of South African adaptations 
continue to need to use white intermediaries in order to gain funding and that this is a 
continuation of the same situation that manifested itself in the 1980s with anti-apartheid films 
like A Dry White Season (1989) and Cry Freedom (1987) (ibid.).  
 
Filmmaker Teddy Mattera also takes issue with the NFVF's allocation to 'reconciliation' films as 
he believes that many black South African filmmakers want to explore "residual anger and the 
limits of reconciliation", but that investors are not interested in these kinds of topics (Dovey, 
2007: 147). Thus the NFVF's recent focus upon commercialism and selling the rainbow nation 
ideal to overseas territories has potentially damaging effects because Sediba "has almost become 
a prerequisite for NFVF funding" (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 82) Furthermore, Young argues that:  
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Another side effect of the Sediba ethos is that without NFVF buy-in on some level it makes 
it harder for local producers to find funding elsewhere. As a first-time filmmaker, without the 
NFVF one has very little chance of accessing funding from the DTI or Industrial 
Development Corporation; beyond that, international film funds seldom look at co-funding 






























6. Suleman and Peterson: Against the Rainbow 
 
The previous chapter explored some of the various issues that have characterised the post-
apartheid film funding environment. It was shown that a number of factors, such as poor 
audience development and funding bodies' emphasis upon attracting international investment, 
have had the unfortunate effect of preventing some potential cinematic texts from even 
developing past the initial scripting phase. At this point, it is useful to begin to look beyond the 
broader economic context and closer at how a film's content interacts with the discourses of 
Rainbowism. To aid in this task, the chapter to follow shall use two films directed by Ramadan 
Suleman as case studies. 
 
6.1. Ramadan Suleman 
 
Maingard writes that the films of director Ramadan Suleman and his frequent collaborator 
screenwriter Bhekiziwe Peterson are unique in the South African context because they resist easy 
attempts at closure (2007: 166). The fact that the pair saturates their films with an ambiguity that 
does not lead to easy answers or stereotypical readings also renders them incredibly unique in 
this context (2007: 166). Suleman and Peterson attempt to explore the complexity that comes 
from having a South African identity and try to explore new ways of seeing "South African-
ness" in the post-apartheid context (ibid.).  
 
Their films reject the discourses of the rainbow nation, as well as many of the motifs of 
redemption and forgiveness that have become synonymous with many post-apartheid films that 
deal with the apartheid past (Dovey, 2007: 147). Dovey defines the general character of the pair's 
films as being one in which "no amount of forgiveness can bring redemption" because "the 
damage has already been done" (ibid.). Instead the camera's focus is upon the black communities 
of South Africa and their attempts to rediscover their dignity and reaffirm the humanity which 
apartheid tried to take from them (ibid.).    
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Suleman's career is defined by a decidedly internationalist streak, he was born in Durban in 1955 
and has been living in France since the 1980s (Botha, 2012: 185; Ukadike, 2002: 281). He comes 
from a theatrical background having been a founding member of the Dhlomo Theatre in the early 
1980s, which was the first black theatre in South Africa (Botha, 2012: 185). After the theatre was 
closed by the apartheid authorities in the middle of the 1980s, he studied film in South Africa 
and France (ibid.). He also comes from a unique filmmaking background because "unlike the 
majority of South African filmmakers, who have little or no knowledge of African cinema" he 
has worked with renowned African filmmakers such as Med Hondo from Mauritania and 
Souleymane Cisse from Mali (Dovey, 2009: 70). Dovey argues that these experiences have led to 
Suleman shaping his own style of filmmaking that uses the aesthetic and ideological frameworks 
of West African cinema to tell South African stories (ibid.).  
 
This vastly different background often leads to Suleman's work being analysed through auteurist 
frameworks, a somewhat ironic situation considering Suleman himself has spoken out against 
what he feels is the dictatorial control that African directors hold over their sets (Suleman in 
Ukadike, 2002: 282). He also feels that filmmaking should be more of a collaborative endeavour 
(ibid.). Maingard defines Suleman's work in a similar fashion as she credits Suleman's frequent 
collaborator Bhekiziwe Peterson with an equal share of the creative credit in the films the pair 
have worked on (Maingard, 2007: 166). This chapter shall be taking a similar approach by 
considering Peterson's writings and opinions to be just as definitive as those which Suleman has 
given.  
 
6.2 Fools (1997) 
 
The duo's first feature film, Fools, was an adaptation of Njabulo S. Ndebele's 1983 novella of the 
same name. The film was an international co-production with many different partners; the co-
production status was necessitated predominantly because there were substantial difficulties in 
raising capital for the project (Modisane, 2013: 132). Barlet argues that "Suleman found it 
difficult to secure funding from producers who thought that he was too critical of Africans" 
(Cited in Modisane, 2013: 132).  
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Fools was the first post apartheid film to be directed by a black South African, Modisane links 
this to the celebration of "firsts" that swept the South African public imagination in the 1990s 
(ibid.). Fools is important in that it is representative of black South Africans finally assuming 
some of the principal roles of cinematic production in the country (ibid.). In this sense, it is 
aligned with the broader celebration of the unconditional re-entry of black South Africans into 
the country's public life (ibid.).  
 
Another interesting facet surrounding Fools' status as a "first black" cultural text, is that it is one 
of the first films to address a black audience directly without any discernable political pressure or 
the looming threat of censorship (Modisane, 2013: 133). The "openness of engagement" which 
emerged in the post-apartheid context finally allowed this type of cinema to emerge (ibid.). 
Modisane finds Fools particularly interesting in that it is an "auteurist film that stands at a critical 
distance from dominant articulations of a triumphalist nationalism" (2013: 128). Whether Fools 
is an example of auteur cinema or not is of lesser importance to the rest of that statement. The 
assertion that Fools is a text that stands apart from the triumphant nationalism of this period 
allows one to explore whether Fools is a text that was formulated in response to Rainbowism.  
 
This seems to be the case, because in an interview with Ukadike in 2002, Suleman asserted that 
he felt a cognitive dissonance between the rhetoric of the rainbow nation and the everyday 
poverty and misery that he continued to see saturating post-apartheid society (293). Thus he 
believed that the idea of the rainbow nation was simply a slogan that politicians used to try and 
avoid dealing with this entrenched and intractable poverty leftover from apartheid (ibid.). He 
went on to say that for him: 
 
Fools is some kind of warning to the politicians not to look for easy answers to society's 
problems. The amount of damage done to our people by apartheid is immense. We must look 
for practical long term ways of resolving those issues instead of only saying we are a 
rainbow nation, which could be misread to mean that in South Africa, blacks and whites are 
on equal terms (ibid.). 
 
Suleman also expressed a concern about the lack of a critical cinema in that same interview; he 
said that he believed that “filmmakers are scared to confront the urban political and economic 
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situation of their countries because they fear being sanctioned. Hence they opt for the easy way 
out by making apolitical films" (in Ukadike, 2002: 285). Thus Fools can be seen a markedly 
political film that was made in response to the Rainbowism of the time. 
 
Magogodi argues that Fools acts to destabilise the sense of collective identity by focussing upon 
"protagonists who exist on the margins of such an identity" (2002: 244). In this respect, it bears 
some similarity to the Oliver Schmitz film Mapantsula (1988) because both films focus upon 
black antiheroes who attain some level of political awakening (ibid.). However, the anti-heroic 
traits of petty criminal Panic in Mapantsula are shifted in Fools and subsequently find 
representation in the character of the township teacher Zamani (ibid.). While teaching is 
sometimes considered a noble and dignified profession, the character of Zamani is a profoundly 
unlikeable wretch who earns the viewer's utter contempt. He is a drunken lecher who finds 
himself on the fringes of his community because he has raped one of his students (ibid.). 
Magogodi argues that the act of placing a rapist as the central protagonist of the story forces the 
viewer to question how the black community has been represented in South African cinema up to 
this point in time (ibid.). Zamani subsequently becomes an entry point "to accessing individual 
identities within that elusive collective called the people" (ibid.). 
 
In one scene, Zamani is shown as suffering from impotence when he tries to engage in coitus 
with a sex worker in an alley (Magogodi, 2003: 191). Magogodi argues that it is possible to see 
Zamani's sexual impotence in political terms, in much the same way that one could do a political 
reading of the impotence of El Hadji in Ousmane Sembene's classic African film, Xala (1974) 
(2003: 190). Magogodi argues that in Fools Zamani's body is punished with sterility for his sins 
(2003: 192). He argues that this sterility is meant to underscore the broader political and moral 
sterility of teachers during the struggle against apartheid (Magogodi, 2003: 191). In this sense, 
this is a similar strategy to that which Sembene uses in Xala where "El Hadji's sexual impotence 
is symbolic of the failure of the new ruling elite to overhaul the oppressive and exploitative 
social conditions" (Magogodi, 2003: 192). The link between sexual impotency and political 
impotency is not the only interesting link between Fools and motifs that are usually found in 
wider African cinemas. It is possible to see a variation of the comedic archetype of the 
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"debarque" (been to) in the character of the school principle, Meneer. The "debarque", is 
essentially a term used to describe a mentally-colonised character who valorises the West 
(usually France) and tries to emulate Western standards to the point of absurdity (Tcheuyap, 
2011: 50). Tcheuyap says that "African filmmakers almost always represent these figures, 
although they often wield power, as victims, allowing spectators to laugh at them and thereby 
reclaim some of their power" (ibid.). 
 
While in Francophone African Cinema the debarque character mostly valorises France, in Fools, 
Meneer valorises White Afrikaner nationalist culture to the point of absurdity. Magogodi notes 
the ironic fate that befalls the principle, he gets whipped by the white man at the end of the film 
because he was too excessive in celebrating a holiday that "foregrounds assumed white 
superiority over blacks" (2002: 254). In this respect, the comeuppance Meneer receives, allows 
black audience members to laugh and cathartically reclaim some of the power which they lost to 
apartheid functionaries like Meneer. This interpretation of Meneer as a debarque-type character 
that serves a cathartic purpose in the narrative is not shared by some scholars. An example would 
be Luc Renders, who argued that that Meneer is a caricature, one that emerges as a result of the 
film being a poor cinematic adaptation that turned all the novella's subtleties into a "series of 
overstatements" (2007: 249). The fact that Meneer is shown to a rabid nationalist party supporter 
in the year 1989 also raises Renders ire because he asserts that ANC comrades would never have 
tolerated such blatant pro-government behaviour during the height of the struggle (ibid.).  
 
However, Renders' view somewhat misses the point because the year is not particularly 
important in the grand scheme of the film. This is because as Suleman asserted in an interview 
with Barlet in 1995, Fools was chosen as a project because Ndebele's novella explored the 
"psychological sequels of a system inscribed in a 'History' that began long before apartheid" 
(Cited in Modisane, 2013: 136). "Psychological sequels" in Modisane's understanding are the 
recurring traumas that black South Africans have faced as a result of "colonial oppression, and 
gendered and racial capitalism" (2013: 136). In this regard, psychological sequels continue to 
resonate well into the post-apartheid era for Suleman, therefore the film's concerns can be seen to 
“antedate and even postdate the apartheid system" (ibid.). 
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In this regard, the character of "Forgive Me" is also a very interesting presence in the film; he is 
a homeless veteran of the Second World War who is occasionally heard shouting the refrain 
"Father forgive them!" (Maingard, 2007: 167). Magogodi argues that he represents a re-
appropriation of Christianity (2002: 252). Christianity has a long history of having been used as 
legitimating myth in service to colonial projects in the South African context (ibid.). Especially 
in the context of Afrikaner nationalism, with the Calvinist state casting the descendents of the 
Dutch settlers as the chosen people of God (ibid.). The fact that he continues to wear his old 
army helmet, also locates his body in a particular historical context as a survivor of the Second 
World War (ibid.). Magogodi asserts that in this sense:  
 
The body of Forgive Me can be read as a historical document of the false promise of 
freedom made by the British and South African governments who had asked Africans to join 
the war against Hitler. After the war it is the Dutch settlers who were to retain the spoils, 
while the likes of Forgive Me are left in tatters as signified by the torn garments that cover 
his body (ibid.) 
 
Therefore, Forgive Me represents the "return of the repressed" in that he shows that the history of 
degradation for black South Africans goes back a very long way (ibid.). Forgive Me also perhaps 
serves as a warning to contemporary black viewers that the liberationist narratives found within 
Christianity, and the promises of freedom that were given to those who fought Hitler did not 
manifest into genuine freedoms for black South Africans. Therefore, Forgive Me might be 
reference to the need for black South Africans not to get caught up in the triumphant nationalism 
of the halo-period, and that the best course of action is to tread lightly going forward.  
 
This ties into one of the main messages of Fools, one which Suleman and Peterson sought to 
impart upon black South African viewers, namely, the necessity of introspection in the black 
community (Modisane, 2013: 135). However, Modisane argues that this introspection is defined 
as going beyond seeing South African history as a dichotomy of black and white confrontation 
(2013: 135). In an interview before Fools was even made, Suleman asserted that "Fools will not 
be a film about the eternal conflict between the 'diabolical' white and the 'magnificent' black, but 
simply a film about the black South African people of just four years ago" (Cited in Modisane, 
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2013: 135). Modisane argues that Suleman's cinematic endeavours were motivated by a quest to 
subvert the "fixed adversarial images in the racial imagination of both the apartheid state, and 
some of its opponents" (Modisane, 2013: 135). In this regard, it becomes possible to view 
Suleman as a filmmaker who seeks to denaturalise the identity myths of apartheid, myths that 
were premised upon each group valorising itself while denigrating "the other" (Reid, 2011: 7). 
This introspection is thus "cognisant of racial conflict, but disavows it" (ibid.).  
 
This is seen at the end of Fools when the Dingaan's Day celebrations are interrupted by a white 
man whose car was struck by an errant rock. The white man takes his rage out on Zamani, but 
the fallen teacher is able to withstand the pain of the horse whip, a pain which Suleman calls 
"symbolic of the 350 years of suffering black South Africans have endured" (in Ukadike, 2002: 
294). Suleman argues that the white man is rendered powerless by Zamani's laughter and the 
decision to let the white man live implies that he will hopefully will come to regret his deeds and 
change his ways (in Ukadike, 2002: 295). This is also the likely reason as to why the debarque 
character of Meneer is not killed or maimed in the film. Suleman summarises this non-violent 
ending thusly:  
 
It is basically saying to South Africans that throwing stones or using a gun is not the only 
way left for us to deal with our current problems. We wanted to state that there could always 
be alternatives (ibid.). 
 
In this respect, Suleman believes that the issue at hand is that black people have to come to grips 
with their history before they can start to come to grips with white people (in Ukadike, 2002: 
293).  
 
6.3 Fools as an Exemplar for the Future 
 
The fact that Fools is set in Soweto in 1989, creates a certain amount of incongruence in the 
minds of those who are familiar with the historical images of turmoil and political violence that 
are most often associated with black townships in the 1980s. When one considers that the chaotic 
nature of the 1980s has often been stressed in various accounts regarding that era, the images one 
sees in Fools might appear strange to the post-apartheid viewer. In this respect, Fools can be 
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seen as creating a synecdoche of the apartheid township experience in order to avoid 
Rainbowism-affirming contrasts between the chaos of the 1980s and the relative peace that the 
audiences of the late 1990s were experiencing during the halo-period.  
 
This refusal to make things easier for potential viewers in the late 1990s allows one to read the 
film as employing something of an archival tendency. In the chapters above it was shown that 
the existing South African audiences in the immediate post-apartheid era were still revelling in 
rainbow nationalism. As a result of this situation, these audiences were not yet ready (or perhaps 
unwilling) to engage with the type of discourses that a subversive film such as Fools was putting 
forth. Therefore as Modisane asserts, the "circulation of Fools and its public discursivity were 
constrained by the existing conventions of film distribution in South Africa" (2013: 145). 
However just because a film does not make much of an impact on audiences when it first comes 
out, it does not mean that it will not have value in the future. Fools has the potential to be utilised 
as a cinematic resource by South African filmmakers in the future who might be interested in 
making films about the apartheid past. It is a rare example of a film made during the Halo-period 
that does not utilise the conventions of Rainbowism, this enables one to read it as adding to the 
multiplicity of cinematic texts about the apartheid past. A multiplicity of texts about the past 
helps to prevent narratives from crystallising and becoming narrow in terms of how people 
engage with the past in the present (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 72).  
 
In essence, Fools can be seen as a cinematic text that other filmmakers (who might not be 
interested in Rainbowist themes and aesthetics) can draw upon or perhaps build upon in creating 
their own motion pictures about the apartheid past. In a sense, Fools can be seen to be 
performing this type of action already because in one sequence in which Zamani is shown 
walking through the township, the camera roams and captures small fragments of the daily lives 
of the township's inhabitants with a wedding being shown. This sequence is very interesting for 
those who have seen Lionel Rogosin's 1959 film Come Back, Africa. In Rogosin's film there is a 
very similar sequence in which Zacharia and his wife are walking through the streets of the 
Sofiatown Township. The camera seemingly wanders and we see a cross-section of township life; 




Therefore, a viewer who is familiar with both of these films might make this connection. While 
there is the possibility that the similarities are coincidences there is also the potential to see Fools 
as building upon antecedent texts in order to counter-act the rainbowist discourses which sees the 
past as something that everyone experienced in the same way and which the nation moved on 
from as a collective (Peterson, 2009: 23). The fact that everybody "knows" the basic details of 
the traumatic past also does not preclude the discussion of those events. In Fools, this facet is 
embodied by a conversation that Zamani and his wife Nosipho have regarding his proclivities. 
The fallen teacher asks his wife “I thought put this matter behind us?" to which his wife replies: 
"When we never even talked about it?"  
 
The question of speaking about the past, and in what form such a conversation should take place 
and between whom, became the subject of Suleman and Peterson's 2004 feature film Zulu Love 
Letter.  
 
6.4 Zulu Love Letter (2004) 
 
Zulu Love Letter was one of four feature films released in 2004 which dealt in some way with the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Dovey, 2009: 54). The film was a co-production between 
South African and France which was made with support from the NFVF and the European Union 
ACP Cinema Fund (Moyer-Duncan, 2011: 71). The film only had a return of R140, 062 after a 
modest release on seven screens but it prompted a significant amount of debate in the media and 
in film circles (ibid.).   
 
The film's writer Bhekiziwe Peterson started writing the film in about 1998, the year of Fools' 
South African release (Peterson, 2009: 19; Modisane, 2013: 143). He claims that during this 
period, the term "transition" was floating around the political landscape as South Africans were 
repeatedly told that the country was in the midst of a transition (2009: 19).  Peterson argues that 
government's decision to foster national unity and a sense of nationhood amongst the diverse 
groups that made up contemporary South Africa was unsurprising (ibid.). However, he argues 
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that the idea of a rainbow nation and the "aspiration of reconciliation" which were extolled in 
pursuit of creating national unity had serious flaws (ibid.). He argues that:  
 
... the invocation of a nation that is „united in its diversity‟ did not allow, as an ideal, for any 
sustained and meaningful wrestling with the politics of race and inequality, both in the past 
and in the present (ibid.). 
 
Furthermore, Peterson argues that the continual invocation of a diverse and unified nation was 
"consistent with the dominance of whiteness" (ibid.). By "whiteness" Peterson is referring to the 
"reproduction of white cultural values, political assumptions and privileges as normative" (ibid.). 
Peterson goes on to say that the political changes the country had experienced were "glossed 
over as a miracle" and there was a sense that continuing problems would eventually resolve 
themselves (ibid.). In this respect, Peterson asserts that he and Suleman agreed that the narrative 
of Zulu Love Letter had to "explore concerns that were in danger of being ignored, repressed or 
glossed over because they went against the grain of the „feel-good' mantras of the new 
dispensation" (2009: 20). 
 
The question for Peterson was how nation-building was to progress beyond simply an ideal if 
South African society continues to repress and deny the manifold societal problems that emerged 
as a result of the past (ibid.). He believed that the problems in South African society are unlikely 
to be overcome if citizens are not granted both space and time to address their personal and 
parochial anxieties in ways "that are not necessarily consistent with or parallel to the initiatives 
and needs of the larger society" (Peterson, 2009: 23). It becomes apparent that Peterson was 
engaging with Rainbowism, albeit he did not call it such.  
 
Zulu Love Letter can in this sense be seen as a cinematic text that seeks to stand apart from the 
rainbowist tendency to see the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as having been wholly 
successful mechanism that dealt with the effects of the apartheid past in their totality. The film 
has as its protagonist, Thandeka Khumalo, a journalist in post-apartheid South Africa who is 
struggling to harmonise her own struggle experiences with the "collective amnesia" of the 
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society around her (Dovey, 2009: 54). She finds herself alienated in the new South Africa 
because she is unable to pretend that everything is fine as she sees continuities with the past 
everywhere (Peterson in McCluskey, 2009: 168). 
 
Thandeka is visited by Me'Tau, the mother of Dineo, she asks Thandeka to help her to try and 
find where Dineo's body is buried. Dineo was a young activist who was assassinated by the 
security police, an act which Thandeka witnessed and one that was caught on film by her 
photographer colleague, Michael Peters (Maingard, 2007: 171). Maingard notes how the 
character of Me'Tau uses the metaphor of thousands of souls roaming the land because their 
bones have not been found (ibid.). She argues that: 
 
 ... this is a parable for the broader national spirit. With apartheid's atrocities and brutalities 
unresolved in the hearts and souls of the nation's people there cannot be reparation and the 
future cannot be free. This story becomes representative therefore of a national story that is 
central to the country's future (Maingard, 2007: 169) 
 
The security police eventually got a hold of both Thandeka and Peters; they subsequently 
tortured Thandeka and fatally poisoned Peters (Maingard, 2007: 175). Thandeka was pregnant at 
the time and the beating she endured resulted in her child, Simangaliso, being born deaf (ibid.). 
Maingard argues that Simangaliso's deafness shows that even the new generation's lives continue 
to be effected by the apartheid past (2007: 169). She goes on to say that "the film weaves 
intricate webs between the past, the present and the future through the lives of its characters" 
(ibid.).  
 
In this respect, Suleman and Peterson's film continues with the theme of black introspection 
which they began with Fools. Zulu Love Letter does not follow the patterns of other feature films 
about South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation commission which emerged during this period 
(Kruger, 2012: 138). It does not present an array of villainous white Afrikaner stereotypes and 
magical black South Africans with almost superhuman powers of forgiveness as found in John 
Boorman's 2004 film In My Country. Neither does it rely on white protagonist coming from 
outside (or returning) to the country as found in Tom Hooper's film Red Dust (2004), or a  local 
white protagonist as found in Ian Gabriel's Forgiveness (2004) for that matter (Kruger, 2012: 
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139). Kruger argues that Zulu Love Letter does not concern itself with the feelings of the white 
police officers who killed Dineo and numerous other political activists, these particular 
perpetrators are shown as still being able to kill and destroy with impunity even in the mid-1990s 
(2012: 138). Rather the film forgoes a discourse of reconciliation between black and white South 
Africans and instead focuses upon the potential for reconciliation amongst the black community 
(ibid.).  
 
This is symbolised by the relationship between Me'Tau and the black former policeman, 
Dhlamini, who now runs a store and lives a relatively "ordinary" life as a husband and a father 
(Kruger, 2012: 140). The focus upon Dhlamini's back-story, who as a black policeman was also 
a technically a victim of apartheid as well being complicit in the human rights abuses, 
complicates the audience's potential ability to make impromptu moral judgments about his 
character. Me'Tau's persistent efforts to meet him, inspires Dhlamini to park his car outside her 
house one night and wait throughout the night (Kruger, 2012: 142). Kruger summarises the scene 
thusly:  
 
Understandably, Me'Tau considers his behavior a threat to her and her surviving daughter. 
But the film suggests a more complex understanding of the characters when the camera cuts 
back and forth between the two women hiding in the dark house, afraid of Dhlamini‟s 
potential violence against them, and Dhlamini who continues to listen to Song of Solomon in 
his car. Perhaps the biblical narrative of love and devotion is intended to inspire the courage 
he will need to confess his culpability to Me'Tau (2012: 142) 
 
He gets out of the car and starts to walk towards Me'Tau's house, but he stops halfway and 
lingers in the middle of the road for a while before heading back to his car and driving off 
(Kruger, 2012: 142). Kruger argues that it is possible to read this scene as the Dhlamini's first 
tentative steps towards a "different relationship with his past and those he victimized" (ibid.).  
 
Thandeka's engagements with the wounds of the past play out in a different way to Me'Tau's. 
While she had supported Me'Tau's application to investigate what happened to Dineo's body, at 
the beginning of the film she was shown as having personally rejected the TRC as a mechanism 
to address South Africa's violent past, with her going so far as to tell her daughter Simangaliso 
that she won't testify before the commission because “[n]othing can compensate [her] for what 
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[she] went through. And there is no talk of either arresting them or paying the abused families” 
(Kruger, 2012: 140). Towards the end of the film when she arrives at the Tau house the day after 
the Tau's incident with Dhlamini, she discovers that there is wake being held for Dineo and she 
also finds out from Dineo's sister that this has been a monthly occurrence since Dineo went 
missing (Maingard, 2007: 169). Thandeka's conversation with Mapule is worth quoting in full 
for the benefit of the engagement that shall be taking place in the next paragraph:  
 
Mapule: Ke kopa o buwe le Mme [Please talk to my mother] we can‟t turn back now ... I 
mean I can‟t take it anymore, I just can't take living in this house full of mourning and 
sadness, can't live in a house with a permanent wake. 
 
Thandeka: You know why your mother's concerned, don‟t you? Your sister‟s story is my 
story. It is the story of so many families and so is the courage and love that you have shown. 
I've been meaning to testify myself. You want to end the wake in the house ... I need to end 
the wake in my head. I've written and said so much about what is happening around me. 
Now I need to write about what‟s happened to me. This thing it is so big, so frightening, and 
no one knows where it will lead. Your mother is scared that if she goes through with this she 
will lose you. I‟m scared that if I don‟t go through with this, I will lose myself ... and 
Simangaliso (Peterson & Suleman, 2009: 110).       
  
 
Throughout the film, Thandeka's memories of her past experiences had broken through her 
subconscious and significantly effected her life in the present (Maingard, 2007: 171). Thus 
Thandeka sees the TRC as a means of possibly "ending the wake in [her] head" and helping her 
to build a better relationship with her daughter. This is a marked contrast to other films about this 
period in South African history, as Thandeka's "need to write about what‟s happened to [her]" is 
not connected to forging national unity so much as familial unity in the face of a terrible past. 
However, the comment that Dineo's story is also her story also positions Thandeka's personal 
experience within the broader national story (Maingard, 2007: 175). The film thus highlighted 
the TRC's value within a wider context of black communities coming to terms with themselves 
and their experiences. In this respect, the film accepts the TRC as a mechanism for coming to 
terms with what happened but at the same time it is cognisant of the TRC's limitations. 
 
However, this affirmation of the TRC as having public value does not erase the other problems 
plaguing post-apartheid society. In the post-apartheid South Africa of Zulu Love Letter, the past 
is a septic wound that is still claiming victims. Towards the end of the film, Moola, the character 
that is most well adjusted to the new South Africa, is tragically killed in a staged car accident 
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which was presumably orchestrated by one of Dineo's assassins (ibid.). After Thandeka arrives at 
the scene she is filled with rage and grief when she sees the carnage and learns that Simangaliso 
is missing. She drives to the large house of Councillor Khubeka in the middle of the night and 
demands to speak with him. Kruger argues that Khubeka "not only represents the new political 
dispensation but, as a former activist and present TRC member, is also symbolically linked to the 
past and to the (ideal) future" (2012: 142). In the conversation between the two, the metaphorical 
gap between politicians and those they serve is illustrated by Thandeka's demand for some-form 
of retributive justice and Khubeka's well-intentioned but empty platitudes about the "truth 
coming out".  
 
However, Peterson argues that the "unfinished and messy business of apartheid, does not lend 
itself to tidy solutions" (2009: 22) Thus by the by end of the film Dineo's bones still haven't been 
found, but Me'Tau is joined by Thandeka and the mothers of other murdered activists in 
performing a cleansing ceremony at the farm where Dineo's body and many others were burned 
beyond recognition (Moyer-Duncan, 2011: 71; Peterson & Suleman, 2009: 120). It remains 
unclear about whether "either woman will further pursue their case against the police officers by 
testifying before the TRC" or whether those who killed Moola will ever face justice (Moyer-
Duncan, 2011: 71).  
 
In this respect, Kruger argues that the film recognises that even a somewhat compromised 
institution with serious problems can be reclaimed to some extent by those "who have been 
violently silenced by an authoritarian regime" (2012: 140-141). Thus Me'Tau and Thandeka will 
potentially reclaim the TRC as a "medium through which private pain can enter public 
awareness" (ibid.). However, the journey towards healing and reconciliation has only just begun 








7. Rainbowism and the South African Gangster Film 
 
7.1 Jerusalema: Hijacking the Rainbow 
 
This chapter argues that it is possible to define Ralph Ziman's 2008 Gangster film, Jerusalema, 
according to the wider category of "crime fiction" in Africa which Tcheuyap writes about (2011, 
106). "Crime fiction" is a very broad term which includes film noirs; police procedurals, cop 
films, gangster films and various other examples (ibid.). The width of the genre of crime fiction 
makes it difficult to articulate a definition which "encompasses several historical, theoretical, and 
even cultural periods" (ibid.). Leitch defines the standard "crime film" as following common 
structural patterns:  
 
Every crime story predicates leading roles: the criminal who commits the crime, the victim 
who suffers it, and the avenger or detective who investigates it in the hope of bringing the 
criminal to justice and establishing the social order the crime had disrupted (2002: 13). 
 
This type of narrative organisation, involves a set group of formulaic conventions and stock 
characters, which is typical of most "mainstream" cinemas (Tcheuyap, 2011: 106). While some 
crime film genres, such as the hard-boiled detective story might be critical of the system which it 
represents, it also presupposes that a specific social order exists (ibid.). Namely, that there is 
something of a natural order where all institutions generally function as they should on paper 
where "the state is responsible for and guarantees the welfare of the citizens" and "the police and 
lawyers enforce legal rules and protect the vulnerable" (ibid.). Tcheuyap argues that structurally, 
the majority of crime films end by reinstituting the disrupted order (ibid.). This is a narrative 
construction that makes the crime film genre ultimately conservative (ibid.). Yet, filmmakers in 
Africa have generally been able to adopt Hollywood genres with more or less success (ibid.). O' 
Regan asserts that various national cinemas have managed to "carve a space both locally and 
internationally for themselves in the face of a dominant international cinema" which obviously 
exists in the form of Hollywood (1996, 1). Filmmakers in Africa have succeeded in making 
genres indigenous to their film industries by reworking them according to their own cultural 
sensibilities (Tcheuyap, 2011: 107).  
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Tcheuyap argues that in the post-colonial African context the dramatisation or examination of 
crime "becomes synonymous with determining a political economy of death and its new 
redistribution between the upper and the lower echelons of the social ladder: the state has lost its 
entitlement to kill and deliver justice" (ibid.). In many post-colonial African countries the state is 
no longer seen as being a fully legitimate entity in the eyes of the people because the 
commandement becomes fractured, the commandement refers to a ruling system in post-colonial 
societies which according to Achille Mbembe: 
 
... embraces the images and structures of power and coercion, the instruments and agents of 
their enactment, and a degree of rapport between those who give orders and those who are 
supposed to obey (Without, of course, discussing) them (2001: 134). 
 
Thus as Tcheuyap argues, in a context in which the institutional apparatus is the "prime criminal" 
it is difficult to affirm Leitch's statement that the crime film's central function is "to allow 
viewers to experience the vicarious thrills of criminal behavior leaving them free to condemn this 
behavior, whoever is practicing it" (Tcheuyap, 2011: 118; Leitch, 2002: 306). While the South 
African state might not bear as much antipathy from its people as other states in Africa, the 
trenchant criticisms of post-apartheid society levelled against the state in Jerusalema raise 
questions specifically about the status of Rainbowism as a dominant discourse.  
 
In 2010, the film's director Ralph Ziman called Jerusalema the “the first film of the Zuma 
generation” (Lehman, 2011: 114). A reference to the controversial Jacob G. Zuma, the President 
of South Africa who entered the Presidency under a cloud of corruption allegations and various 
other controversies. Ziman later told the online journalist Brendon Connelly:  
 
From the outside, South Africa is always being given a rosy view by the world media. I 
understand why they do it, and I‟m glad they do it. But I think from the inside, while we 
were making it, you sensed there was a lot of disatisfaction with (Thabo) Mbeki‟s 
government, with the ANC, with the fact that 15 years after the end of apartheid, poor people 
were poorer and worse off than ever before economically, and rich people were richer than 
they‟d ever been. (2010: online resource). 
 
Lehman argues that Ziman makes an explicit case for the film to be read as a political critique of 
economic imbalance in the second decade of South Africa's democracy (2011: 114). However it 
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is also an example of South African counter-cinema which utilises Hollywood or 1st Cinema 
conventions to attract a wide audience, an audience who would come for the action and leave 
having had the linguistic signifiers of the post-apartheid state emptied of significance as a result 
of the continuous ironic usage in the cinematic text (Saks, 2010: 159; De Villiers, 2009: 15).    
 
However, in order to explore the variation of Rainbowism that Jerusalema is seeking to counter 
through its cinematic representations, one needs to briefly explore some facets of the gangster 
genre. Robert Warshow's famous essay The Gangster as Tragic Hero served as the framework 
that Jack Shadoian would elaborate upon in his 1977 essay Dreams and Dead Ends: The 
American Gangster/Crime Film (Govender, 2011: 8). Shadoian's argument was that that the 
structure inherent in the gangster film is "ready made for certain kinds of concerns" (ibid.). These 
concerns were tied into the discourse of "American Dream" and the contradictions therein (ibid.). 
"The American Dream" is all about the drive to succeed in a capitalist sense, it also contains 
within it the ideals of a society that is essentially classless where every individual is free and 
equal (ibid.). This contradiction becomes apparent when one considers the fact that a society in 
which an individual can "have it all" and rise above everybody else to succeed then the society 
cannot be classless at the same time (ibid.). Govender argues that the gangster film can be 
adapted to different national contexts, but the figure of the gangster remains an enduring and 
effective way to explore the aspirations inherent in a particular socio-historical context, and the 
forces that seek to punish or limit those aspirations (2011: 10).  
 
The "South African dream" in this context can be seen as an extension of the idea of the rainbow 
nation; it is much like the American Dream in that both myths are accompanied by the capitalist 
idea that everyone has opportunity to succeed if they work hard (Govender, 2011: 8). But just 
like "American Dream" the invocation of the rainbow nation serves to imply equality in the 
present that does not take into account the way historical events and the legacy of racism still 
effects the present.    
 
When Lucky starts his telling his story for the journalist in the beginning of the film, he 
contextualises his rise to infamy in terms of the post-apartheid moment which began in 1994 
with the first democratic elections (Govender, 2011: 89). The viewer sees a montage of news 
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footage set to Nkosi Sikel' iAfrica during this sequence (ibid.). This helps the viewer to get the 
impression that there was genuine sense of hope during these early days (ibid.). The newness of 
the country is made apparent by Lucky's voiceover narration:  
 
"Freedom… a new South Africa… a new dawn… a new day… a fresh start… a clean 
page… a new beginning… and I had dreams. The dreams were the security system of the 
black urban economy. My best friend Zakes and I were sucking that blood, selling peanuts 
for peanuts. However, free enterprise was never encouraged." 
 
Thus the opportunities and some of the contradictions of the new South Africa become apparent 
from the very beginning of the film (Govender, 2011: 90). Lucky bought into the discourses of 
the rainbow nation in which supposedly anyone can achieve their dreams regardless of their 
ethnicity, skin colour or background (ibid.). The statement that "free enterprise was never 
encouraged" is thus ironic because according to Govender, "it was precisely the idea that anyone 
could now be an entrepreneur that the new dispensation promised" (ibid.).  Lucky does not start 
out as a criminal; he does everything that is usually attributed to getting onto the road to financial 
success. He is shown as studying hard at school, avoiding trouble and applying for a place at a 
University (ibid.). However, when it came time for the opportunities that were promised him to 
come to fruition, he finds out that there is no financial aid to allow him to follow his dreams at 
University and escape poverty (ibid.). Thus the larger contradictions of the "New South Africa" 
are revealed as the opportunity for a better life is there for some, but Lucky is prevented from 
grasping at it because of circumstances beyond his control (ibid.). Thus a fresh break from the 
effects of the apartheid past never comes for Lucky Kunene and many others of his generation. It 
is possible to see this situation as a commentary on how one's race still affects one's economic 
potential even though the formal structures of apartheid have gone. 
 
Lucky's road to the criminal life was paved with promises of what "the post 1994 neo-liberal 
society told him he could be and could achieve" (Govender, 2011: 92). Thus Lucky "has been the 
victim of a system that needs people to be at the bottom in order for there to be a top" (ibid.).  
Govender argues that Lucky knows that can never get to the top through living as a legal citizen, 
because the "South African dream" much like the "American Dream" is full of contradictions 
(ibid.).   
66 
 
Lesley Marx argues that much of the film's effectiveness emerges from an "astute and 
unnervingly funny attack on South African Newspeak" (2010: 274). In this respect, the film's 
dialogue and voiceover exposition is laden with slogans and phrases that have infiltrated South 
African public discourse during the halo-period (Govender, 2011: 93). Thus Lucky becomes 
fluent in the way the new South Africa has been linguistically constructed (ibid.). However, he 
realises that these words associated with the halo-period have in many cases been utilised 
without any action to back them up (ibid.). Therefore, he adopts them "to run the same scam as 
the people who have been scamming him and the masses" (ibid.).  
 
When Lucky is arrested by his nemesis, the ironically named Blakkie Swart, who Lehmann 
defines as a "full-scale, unreconstructed apartheid racist, pining for the good old days when he 
could crack black heads with impunity" (2011: 117). His lawyer, Lucas Sithole says that “it is 
convenient for the government to blame Kunene. The government has failed dismally to provide 
the houses they promised the people” (Govender, 2011: 93). Thus the state's failure is one that 
Lucky takes full advantage off to achieve his own dreams at the expense of the poor and 
marginalised he was once a part of (ibid.). Govender notes that the film is cognisant of the fact 
that the discourses of “transformation and restitution can be used both cynically and sincerely in 
the current ideological climate" (ibid.).  
 
7. 2 Nazareth: The Discarded Spear of the Nation 
 
The hot-headed character of Nazareth is very interesting as he represents both a segment of 
society whose voice has been silenced by Rainbowism in the new South Africa, and a character 
that has been marginalised by the changes in the way national identity is defined.  
 
De Villiers argues that Jerusalema positions itself against a discursive backdrop of the character 
of the gangster developing a political or ethical consciousness (2009: 8). Mapantsula showed 
Panic's political awakening, while in Tsotsi the main character developed an "ethical awareness" 
(ibid.). He goes on to say that in the new South Africa, "anti-systematic behaviour" that once 
could once have been justified when attached to revolutionary aims, has no such place in the 
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post-revolutionary context of post-apartheid South Africa (de Villiers, 2009: 8). This situation 
underlies Nazareth's central problem, he was trained as a weapon to fight a war for "the nation" 
and when he came back to South Africa, the conceptualisation of "the nation" was swiftly 
expanded to include former adversaries who did not have to give up anything while he remained 
poor (Govender, 2011: 82). The incongruency between these two states of being causes Nazareth 
significant anger; he states in a conversation with Nigerian Crime Boss Tony Ngu that “they told 
us we were going to punish these whities. We were going to take from them” (ibid.). However, 
Nazareth is not only angry because of his lack of reconditioning and his residual anger towards 
his white compatriots, he also feels: 
 
... ousted from the lineage of the ruling party as the spoils of the “New South Africa” have 
not gone to him and other former ANC soldiers, who have been ignored or glossed over in 
the history of the country in favour of a more united and reconciliatory ethos. While 
politicians and businessmen have benefited from liberation Nazareth, and former ANC 
soldiers like him, have been cast aside (Govender, 2011: 82) 
 
Barlet argues that Jerusalema adopts "all the gimmicks of the action film" and that it offers the 
viewer "efficient Hollywood-style images, wham-bam editing and a hunky hero" (2010: 112). He 
goes on to say that the main problem he sees with the film is the way it conforms to stereotypes, 
with the violence Nazareth displays and Ngu's nationality linked intrinsically to already existing 
stereotypes currently associated with anti-black racism and xenophobia respectively (Barlet, 
2010: 112). Barlet believes that by "portraying townships as lawless hoods" the film ignores the 
"violence of apartheid which so destroyed the country" (ibid.). 
 
This opinion contrasts strongly with that of Barry Ronge, the most well known movie reviewer 
in South Africa, who argues that the violence in Jerusalema raises a series of vital questions 
about South Africa's particularly violent history, he says that: 
 
Ziman is not just making a crime thriller but touching on a culture of lawless acquisitiveness 
rooted deeply in South Africa‟s colonial and apartheid history and culture. How does Lucky 
Kunene in Hillbrow in 2008, differ from the rapacious, racist old "randlords" of 




7.3 Jerusalema and the NFVF 
 
Botha states that by "11 September 2008 Jerusalema has made R1.2 million at the South African 
box office. It is one of the few South African films, apart from the Leon Schuster comedies, to 
reach the R1 million mark" (2012: 191). The film was shot on a very-low budget with Ziman 
declaring cheekily that some of his earlier music videos had bigger budgets (Le Cordeur, 2008: 
online resource). Yet the production quality was still very high, NFVF CEO Eddie Mbalo is on 
record as saying that “the film's high production values attest to the ability of the South African 
film industry to meet global standards of quality in filmmaking, while retaining a distinct South 
African flavour that has universal appeal” (In "Jerusalema submitted for...", 2008: online 
resource).  
 
Ziman was bitter at the lack of support the film received from the NFVF, he said that "even 
though we made a film that has an all-South African cast and crew, they refused to help 
[financially]" (in Le Cordeur, 2008: online resource). Mbalo responded to this view thusly: 
 
We did give them reasons why we wouldn‟t support them, but it came down to the fact that 
they didn‟t need the money. We promote the development of film and try to support those 
needing finance. They [Jerusalema filmmakers] should be happy they didn‟t get government 
support, because now that money will go to the less fortunate filmmakers, I don‟t think 
developed filmmakers should join the begging bowl queue; let us use state funds to get new 
filmmakers (ibid.). 
 
This seems to be a slightly obscurantist excuse from Mbalo, as the likely reason the NFVF 
baulked at the idea of providing funding for the film was the fact that Jerusalema raised very 
uncomfortable questions about the neo-liberal foundations upon which the post-apartheid state is 
built. It also represented a vision of contemporary South Africa that was not aspirational in the 
rainbowist sense. In an interview located on the DVD version of Jerusalema, Ziman said:  
 
We definitely aren‟t making an infomercial for the South African Tourist Board. And, you 
know, perhaps people aren‟t going to like that, but this is an everyday fact of life in 
Johannesburg, and we just wanted to portray what we saw (Cited in Lehman, 2011: 126) 
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The representations located within the film definitely dampened the film's chances of getting 
NFVF funding. In the oft mentioned interview that Treffry-Goatley conducted with Haidarian 
and Mbalo about the Sediba system, Haidarian spoke of the NFVF only intervening when a 
script contained a negative portrayal (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 314). He gave an example of 
reading a good script albeit one that "made one think that one‟s gardener is a crazy killer" and 
that this representation might result in people being as afraid of their gardeners as the film Jaws 
(1975) had made audiences afraid of Sharks (Treffry-Goatley, 2010: 314). In this respect, the 
representation of Nazareth alone might have been enough to make the NFVF reject Jerusalema's 
funding application. If one follows Haidarian's logic, the act of seeing one negative example of 
an Umkhonto We Sizwe veteran might make members of the public suspicious of veterans in 
general. As things stood at the time, the Umkhonto We Sizwe Military Veterans Association did 
not take kindly to the representation of an MK veteran in such a negative light and there might 
have been an even greater outcry had the state funded the film (Govender, 2011: 83). 
 
The fact that a film foundation responsible for administering state finance did not choose to fund 
a film that was immensely critical of the state raises a number of questions. The most-pertinent 
of which was whether the idea of selling the rainbow nation ideal to foreign investors and 
filmmakers was a higher priority than funding a project that would resonate more with local 
audiences, but at the time portray the country in a negative light.   
 
7.4 Dollars and White Pipes: A Gangster Film for the Rainbow Nation 
 
An interesting point of comparison is Donavan Marsh's 2005 film Dollars and White Pipes. The 
film's producer Anant Singh is quoted as saying that:   
 
Dollars and White Pipes is an original South African story. It deals with important social 
issues, while at the same time being very entertaining ... Bernard's life story is inspirational, 
incredibly motivating and very uplifting. He is a positive role model for all South Africans... 
(In "Videovision Entertainment Begins...", 2005: online resource).  
 
Dollars and White Pipes is quite depoliticised in comparison to Jerusalema, the film is based 
upon the real-life story of Bernard Baatjies, an ambitious young man who lives in Hannover Park 
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on the Cape Flats near the photogenic South African city of Cape Town (Marx, 2010: 264). The 
Cape Flats is a windy and barren patch of land; a place where thousands of people were forcibly 
relocated after the apartheid regime classified them as belonging to the "coloured" racial group 
and the Cape Town CBD as a place where only "whites" could live (ibid.). The film appears to 
be set in the mid-to-late 1980s, a time in which small surface reforms were taking place in South 
African society, but nothing was being done to challenge the underlying structure of apartheid 
(Tomaselli, 1989: 9).  
 
Bernard's opening narration, which is somewhat reminiscent of Henry Hill's in Martin Scorcese's 
1990 film Goodfellas, highlights the cycle of violence and boredom which characterises life in 
Hannover Park (Marx, 2010: 264). Bernard takes as his role model JR Ewing from the American 
television show Dallas which Marx argues is an "overt comment on the power of American 
cultural and ideological ascendency" in South Africa (2010: 265). After Bernard gets into trouble 
while trying to get money to buy Mandrax (Quaaludes), he is essentially exiled by his parents. 
He sets off for Cape Town and meets a trusting idiot-savant, Cecil, on the train (ibid.). In Cape 
Town he deploys a "mix of smarm, chutzpah and a disturbing ability to exploit Cecil" and 
eventually he ends up running a popular Cape Town nightclub (ibid.). However Marx notes that:  
 
The protection racket, run by the gangster, Mr Kuyser, whom Bernie dubs the "coloured JR," 
finally forces him out of the Cape Town nightclub business. He does, however, recover his 
sense of moral priorities, saves Cecil at the risk of his own life and, we are told in the final 
title, makes his way to Johannesburg where he runs a restaurant. Egoli, the "city of gold," 
lives up to its name for Bernard (ibid.) 
 
Dollars and White Pipes is very much a gangster film more in line with a rainbowist discourse as 
it shows the problems of South African society as occurring in the apartheid past with no heed 
paid to the problems that continue to exist into the present. Furthermore, Bernard's drug use and 
his brief forays into the "anti-systematic behaviour" of the kind De Villiers references are 
historically contextualised within the pre-1994 period. The end titles imply that the real-life 
Bernard was able to become successful through legal means in the new South Africa.  
 
However, the film also has a problematic undertone in that while the real Bernard Baatjies might 
have found his pot of gold through running a restaurant in Johannesburg, the unspoken 
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implication is that to achieve success one possibly needs to leave their current environment. Thus 
while Bernard's story might indeed be "inspirational" as Anant Singh calls it, there is also 
nothing in the film to suggest that the problems of the Hannover park community can be solved 
or whether things even improved for them post-1994. The film's message in this sense, could be 
that a prospective viewer should embrace the South African dream, work hard and avoid anti-
systematic behaviour but not look too carefully at whether Bernard's type of success can be 
genuinely emulated in the current socio-economic system.   
 
By contrast, the end of Jerusalema sees Lucky escaping police custody in a relatively triumphant 
fashion, the character subsequently avoids the trope of the death of the gangster which is usually 
seen in the genre (Govender, 2011: 96). The fact Lucky survives at the end, can be seen to place 
Jerusalema in the broader context of African Crime Fiction which Tcheuyap wrote about. 
Tcheuyap argues that in many post-colonial African texts the state is seen as having lost its 
"entitlement to kill and deliver justice" because the commandement, a type of social contract 
between the state and the people, had been broken (2011: 107). In Jerusalema, the fact that the 
state's power is manifested in the reactionary character of Blakkie Swart, as well as the fact that 
Lucky did everything right and yet the new dispensation never kept its promises to people like 
him allows one to think that perhaps the state hasn't yet earned the right to kill him (Govender, 
















The topic for this dissertation was inspired by a number of initial questions regarding the state of 
the South African film industry. The primary question that runs throughout this dissertation is 
why is it that in post-apartheid South Africa, a democratic society in which artistic freedom is 
constitutionally guaranteed, does the film industry appear to privilege certain types of cinematic 
narratives while subtly silencing others? 
 
Furthermore, one of the many sub-questions that this dissertation sought to explore in relation to 
this larger question was whether it was possible to speak of the South African film industry as 
one that unofficially subscribes to some variation of the concept known as "Rainbowism". 
Rainbowism was loosely defined in this dissertation as an invocation of the rainbow nation 
identity myth as an expression of collective South African unity whilst silencing debates on race 
and the continuing legacy of the apartheid past. The somewhat loose topic for this dissertation 
also acted as a prism that allowed for the exploration of many different aspect of the post-
apartheid film industry. 
 
In this respect, if one accepts that Rainbowism has had an influence on post-apartheid South 
African cinema then the obvious question is to what extent? What effects might South African 
government policy and funding bodies such as the NFVF have had in relation to themes and 
genre in post-apartheid cinematic texts? Other questions that emerge in this context would be to 
what extent Rainbowism can be seen as intersecting or overlapping with other South African 
film phenomena that emerged as a result of the intensive fragmentation of the industry under 
apartheid?  
 
In this sense, can a lack of audience development be responsible for the silencing of certain 
cinematic narratives in the South African context? A further question would be whether 
Rainbowism can be seen as a method of self-preservation for the South African industry in the 
face of the domination of Hollywood films at the global and local box office? And the final 
pertinent research question would be how are South African filmmakers cinematically 
responding to Rainbowism? 
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Keeping these various questions in mind, this dissertation sought answers from a variety of 
sources.  While South Africa does indeed have a constitution that guarantees artistic freedom and 
the freedom of expression, the South African film industry has almost always sought a means of 
making profit ahead of making art. A situation that was made abundantly clear in the historical 
contextualisation found in Chapter 4. Therefore, the fact that certain types of narratives are 
favoured whilst others are subtly silenced is unfortunately not a new phenomenon. The major 
issue in this regard is the post-apartheid state's reticence in providing a sorely-needed mechanism 
that will allow for the funding of motion pictures for the sake of culture in itself as opposed to 
the potential for profit. 
 
This dissertation has shown that is possible to speak of the South African film industry as one 
that unofficially subscribes to a variation of the concept known as Rainbowism. The effect that 
Rainbowism has had on the South African film industry has been varied and nuanced in many 
cases. This dissertation has focussed specifically on the potential for Rainbowism to make the 
creation of critical or more artistic films quite difficult, especially those that deal with the past in 
uncomfortable ways. The potential for Rainbowism to obfuscate the effects of the past on the 
present has also resulted in filmmakers making films to counter some aspects of Rainbowism, as 
shown in the case studies in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.   
 
Many South African audiences are either unwilling or uninterested in watching films that 
denaturalise Rainbowism after seeing it reified in film and television for nearly two decades. 
While the success of Jerusalema is an obvious exception, on the whole South African audiences 
prefer to go to see South African comedy films that do not challenge the underlying construction 
of the rainbow nation. These audiences also flock to see the products that the Hollywood studios 
frequently release. It was shown in the above chapters that the NFVF's attempts to realign itself 
with the neo-liberal economic frameworks of GEAR has resulted in a funding environment that 
is not conducive to a South African cinema that does not in some way try to mimic what makes 
Hollywood product successful. The NFVF's focus upon catering to the whims of existing 
audiences and the production-for-export market has also causes problems for filmmakers, 
especially in terms of the Sediba scriptwriting course which the NFVF has been running since 
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around 2005. The Sediba system has also created stronger links between the NFVF and the IDC, 
as the NFVF's recent focus upon funding films that mimic the Hollywood style can be seen as an 
attempt to attract international players to come and work in the South African service industry. 
 
In this regard, Rainbowism has had a major effect on the co-productions that have emerged out 
of this context. Many South African stories about the TRC and the apartheid past have been 
made with international partners in order to utilise the "transformational capital" and prestige that 
the "South African miracle" of 1994 brought the country. In this respect, the fact that the story of 
the rainbow nation is being commoditised and used to attract international attention causes 
further problems for filmmakers. The reason being that those who wish to engage with the 
apartheid past in ways that do not include the popular conventions of Rainbowism would find it 
harder to get funding. It was also shown that while low budget and digital filmmaking has 
increased participation in the industry, there is no guarantee that these will provide a platform for 
a more critical or artistic type of cinema.   
 
While Rainbowism may have been the best way to bind South Africa's diverse peoples together 
after apartheid had spent decades dividing them. The fact remains that it has also prevented 
filmmakers from looking beneath the surface of South African society to a certain extent. 
Furthermore, while the IDC and the broader service industry are creating employment for South 
Africans, the fact remains that South Africa's constitution cannot be seen to be properly upheld if 
the right to freedom of expression can only be enacted in ways that are conducive to the making 
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